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Nwokoroeze, C. N. (2026). Exploring the Place of the AU in Fighting Organised Crime in Africa. International Journal of Research, 13(3), 18–29. https://doi.org/10.26643/ijr/2

Nwokoroeze, Chinonye Nnenna 

Department of Political Science,

Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Enugu State University of Science and Technology, Agbani Email: chinonye.nwokoroeze@esut.edu.ng  

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0008-0449-9036

Abstract

The African continent faces a persistent and expanding threat from organised crime. These criminal networks operate across borders, harming peace, security, and economy. The AU  has taken on a critical mission to address these complex concerns. A rising understanding of the interdependence of stability and development throughout the continent is reflected in its shift from a non-interventionist stance to a more proactive involvement in peace and security. This article addresses the AU’s initiatives to prevent organised crime, analysing its established normative frameworks and the practical restrictions that often hinder its usefulness. The study employs a qualitative technique, drawing on secondary data from official AU publications, United Nations reports, and academic literature. The study contends that even though the AU has created a wide range of legal and policy tools, their influence is usually diminished by barriers to cross-border collaboration, a lack of persistent political commitment, and a lack of financial and technical resources. The conclusion emphasises the ongoing disconnect between idealistic aspirations and practical reality. It promotes enhancing the AU’s participation in the fight against organised crime by encouraging greater political resolve and improved resource mobilisation.

Keywords: AU, Organized Crime, Threat, Resources mobilization, United Nations

Introduction

The paper used a 2024 UNODC research to show that organised crime makes violence worse in places like the Sahel and is a vital source of cash for people who are economically challenged. This means that organised crime is not merely a business; it is firmly ingrained in the social and economic institutions of some communities, which makes it a very tough problem to overcome. For example, the drug problem is a concern in all five African regions. The continent has become a key transit route, user, and source for drugs including cocaine and heroin. (2019, the African Union).
The United Nations (2025) said that human trafficking is a severe violation of human rights. It is a sort of modern-day slavery in which traffickers target people who are weak, like those who are poor, in conflict, or displaced. A lot of people are trafficked across borders from Africa, and this is often linked to war, being forced to leave home, and poverty (Tefera, 2019). Illicit financial flows (IFFs) make these difficulties worse by taking $88.6 billion out of Africa’s economy every year, which is 3.7% of the continent’s gross domestic product (GDP) (United Nations, 2021). These outflows make it hard to make essential investments in education, health, and productive sectors, which keeps the cycle of underdevelopment running. Because these problems are connected, organised crime is both a cause of conflict and an indication of underdevelopment. The money earned from unlawful operations promotes wars and degrades institutions and democracy (Thelma et al., 2024). At the same time, the instability and poverty that result from these activities make it easier for criminal networks to emerge as a way to live. This makes things worse and worse.

The African Union (AU) formally takes the place of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 2002. The AU was formed up by the Constitutive Act in 2000 (Maluwa, 2012). This transition was a huge step away from the OAU’s stance of not becoming involved and toward a more comprehensive and collective action approach to peace, security, and stability on the continent (ACCORD, 2024). The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the African Union’s key body for making decisions about how to stop, handle, and settle disputes. This is a fundamental feature of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (African Union [AU]). The PSC is quite powerful. It can stop and avoid wars, make peace, build peace, approve peace support missions, and deal with challenges including unconstitutional changes of government and transnational organised crime (ACCORD, 2024).

This amendment in the AU’s mission illustrates that there is an increasing, albeit tough, commitment to proactive security governance. Organised crime is a significant security concern, as evidenced by the PSC’s 2019 decision to make a yearly conference on transnational organised crime a permanent agenda item (AmaniAfrica, 2025). However, the fact that this annual session has not been consistently held since its institutionalisation, last meeting in May 2022, and the general problems mentioned with the PSC’s reactive approach and slow response (ACCORD, 2024), show that while the normative framework is in place, the political will and practical application to fully realise this proactive mandate are still not consistent. This illustrates the fundamental argument of this article—that there is a discrepancy between the declared purpose and what actually occurs. This article’s objective is to examine the African Union’s regulations for combating organised crime and identify the obstacles to its complete implementation. It examines the various forms of organised crime that are prevalent in Africa, the AU’s legal and policy instruments, the issues that arise when these instruments are applied, and the collaborations and initiatives taken to combat these threats.

A full collection of legal and policy tools of the AU

1. The Assembly’s Special Declaration on Illicit Financial Flows (2015). This declaration committed AU leaders to eliminating persistent illicit financial flows and guaranteeing the recovery of lost financial resources to Africa to support the continent’s development agenda. It called for African institutions and skills to be improved in areas like recovering stolen property, collecting taxes, and making contracts (United Nations, 2021).
2. The African Union’s Constitutive Act, which was passed in 2000, replaced the OAU Charter. This marked a big change in how the continent deals with peace and security (Maluwa, 2012). The OAU was mostly based on the idea that its member states shouldn’t interfere in each other’s internal affairs. This made it hard for the OAU to deal with internal crises or problems with governance (UNODC, 2018). The AU, on the other hand, gave the “right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (African Union, 2000, p. 9). This development provided a more robust legal foundation for the AU to actively address peace and security issues, particularly those concerning transnational organised crime.
3. The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC, 2003). This convention, which was signed in Maputo, shows that everyone in the region agrees on how to stop, punish, and encourage international cooperation in the fight against corruption. It includes a wide range of crimes, such as bribery, illegal enrichment, money laundering, and asset recovery (African Union, 2024a). It also calls for the end of corruption in both the public and private sectors (African Union, 2003). As of January 2020, 43 states had signed this agreement.
4. The African Union Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (AUPA, 2019–2023). This strategy framework, which is the fifth of its kind, promotes a balanced, integrated, and multi-sectoral approach to drug control and crime prevention. It is based on what happened at the 2016 UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the world’s drug problem. The AUPA has a lot of different ways to cut down on drug use and supply, stop crime, reform the criminal justice system, and work together with other countries to stop drug trafficking, guns, corruption, and money laundering (African Union, 2019).
5. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, which was signed in 2002, made the AU’s security role more effective (ACCORD, 2024). Karahalios (Karahalios, 2021) says that the PSC was set up to be the main group that makes decisions about how to stop, handle, and solve conflicts. Its mission is to deal with new dangers, like international organised crime. This change in the law from non-interference to interventionism creates the necessary normative space for anti-crime action. This lets the AU see and treat problems like organised crime as threats to peace and security on the continent. Without this basic change, many of the later anti-crime agreements would not have a clear legal basis for continental involvement. It is important to create this normative space, but it is not enough on its own because other things are needed to make it happen.
6. The African Union’s 2013 plan for controlling the illegal spread, circulation, and trafficking of small arms and light weapons. The goal of this plan is to stop, stop, and completely get rid of the illegal spread of SALW across all of Africa. AmaniAfrica (2022) says that it is focused on building capacity, getting stakeholders to work together and coordinate better, and improving international aid.
7. The Ouagadougou Action Plan to Stop Human Trafficking, Especially for Women and Children (2006). The goal of this strategy is to create general guidelines for fighting human trafficking, raise awareness and prevention, protect and help victims, put in place the right legal frameworks, improve law enforcement, and encourage cooperation. It stresses a “three-pronged strategy” of Prevention, Protection, and Prosecution d) Niamey Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation (2014). This was put in place to encourage cooperation between countries and the peaceful resolution of border disputes. This convention also says that countries should work together to stop piracy, terrorism, and cross-border crime. It needs 15 countries to sign it before it can go into effect (African Union, 2024a).
8. The Assembly’s Special Declaration on Illicit Financial Flows (2015). This declaration committed AU leaders to eliminating persistent illicit financial flows and guaranteeing the recovery of lost financial resources to Africa to support the continent’s development agenda. It called for African institutions and skills to be improved in areas like recovering stolen property, collecting taxes, and making contracts (United Nations, 2021).
   
   

The evolving environment of transnational organised crime in Africa

Illegal use of natural resources: UNODC (2025) claims that organised crime groups play a major role in illicit gold mining, which harms the environment and is fuelled by money laundering, fraud, and corruption. Trafficking in wildlife is also a big problem. Perche et al. (2020) say that organised crime groups that make money off of endangered species are often involved. Organised crime relies heavily on taking advantage of natural resources, which makes environmental problems and problems with governance worse. This shows that illegally taking resources can be a big source of income for criminal gangs, which means that environmental crimes and financial crimes that weaken government control are linked. So, strong management of the natural resource sectors and dealing with the social and economic factors that make people want to illegally exploit resources are both important parts of successful counter-TOC efforts.

Drug trafficking: The United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (2024) says that West and Central Africa are becoming important places for cocaine and heroin to pass through on their way to Europe. These drugs often come from South America and Afghanistan. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) World Drug Report 2020, cocaine seizures in Africa rose by 66% in 2018 and were expected to rise even more in 2019. This shows that Africa is becoming more important as a transit region (UNODC, 2020). This shows that the problem is getting worse because the continent is now a growing market and supply for illegal drugs, as well as a transit hub. For instance, Nigeria and South Africa have shut down illegal methamphetamine labs (UNODC, 2020). The study also found that tramadol, an opioid that isn’t monitored by any international body, is a serious public health issue, especially in West and Central Africa, where it was responsible for 79% of all seizures in 2018. This change in Africa’s role in the global drug market from mainly a transit point to also a place where drugs are made and used means that counter-narcotics strategies must now be multi-faceted, with the goal of fighting both supply and demand on the continent.

Illicit financial flows (IFFs): It noted that the significant loss, amounting to 3.7% of the continent’s GDP, hinders development and exacerbates poverty and inequality. IFFs are closely linked to other illegal activities, like drug trafficking, human trafficking, and selling weapons illegally (African Union, 2024a). These flows are a major roadblock to African development and a major facilitator of other organised crimes. They make conflicts worse and get in the way of sustainable development by weakening institutions and democracy, shrinking the tax base, and taking important resources away from public services like healthcare and education (African Union, 2024a). The estimated $88.6 billion lost each year is a sign of lost opportunities for growth, lost jobs, and rising poverty. This means that fighting IFFs is not only important for keeping money safe, but it is also necessary for long-term growth and stopping crime.

Smuggling migrants and trafficking people : Human trafficking is a serious violation of human rights that is often called “modern-day According to UNODC (2024a), Africa is the source of the most destinations, both inside and outside the continent. One-third of all cross-border human trafficking flows involve people from Africa. The data shows that the number of child victims is alarmingly rising. In Africa in 2022, kids made up 38% of all victims found. Traffickers use technology to lure victims by working online and using social media and encrypted communication tools (United Nations, 2025). This digital growth of human trafficking is scary because it lets criminal groups reach more people and take advantage of them more easily. This shows that technology can be both helpful and harmful, as it can be used by criminals in new ways. Because of this, cybersecurity and digital forensics must be part of anti-trafficking efforts. But the strong link to vulnerable groups shows that technology fixes alone aren’t enough. It’s still important to deal with the root causes of vulnerability, like poverty and violence.

Bringing weapons into the country illegally: Firearms trafficking is a major cause of conflicts, especially in places like the Sahel (AmaniAfrica, 2025). UNODC (2024) says that most of the guns that are trafficked illegally come from legitimate manufacturers but are sold on the black market. This highlights a critical area for intervention. It means that illegal arms trafficking is the most profitable illegal business, allowing organised crime groups to protect their illegal businesses and employees. It is not just a crime on its own; it is also a key part of the whole criminal ecosystem, which includes drug trafficking and illegal use of natural resources. So, limiting the flow of weapons is a good way to break up organised crime groups and bring about peace.

Challenges confronting the AU

1. Different national laws and rules could make it very hard for regions to work together to fight organised crime. To get around these legal problems, it is important to make national laws more similar and adopt universal standards. This is a big legal problem for transnational crime because criminals take advantage of gaps in jurisdiction. The Niamey Convention aims to promote integrated border management and cross-border cooperation (Cassidy-Neumiller et al., 2024). The University for Peace (2022) says that Africa is a good place for illegal businesses and organised crime because of its porous borders and areas that are not controlled. Criminal groups use these open borders to start their activities in very organised and complicated ways, which makes the borders unsafe. Another problem with international cooperation in criminal cases is that people don’t work together when there aren’t any relevant bilateral agreements (UN General Assembly, 2025). It is hard to get mutual legal aid agreements, which makes it hard to prosecute criminals across borders even when they are found. This means that even though the AU has ways for member states to work together, it is often hard to put them into action because of the rights of each member state and the problems that come with enforcing laws across borders. There is a natural conflict between national sovereignty and the international nature of crime that causes legal and practical problems.
2.  Even though AU leaders have promised to do better, they have shown a “persistent lack of genuine and sustained political will,” which has made it hard for them to deal with important problems, such as armed conflicts that hurt civilians and widespread attacks on basic rights (ICG, 2025). The AU’s response to crises is often inconsistent, and sometimes they use the principle of subsidiarity to regional authorities as an excuse not to act.70 There is a big difference between what the AU says it will do and what the member states are actually doing to make it happen and pay for it.  The chaotic running of the Sudanese civil war, where strong African leadership was badly needed but never happened, and the AU Commission’s silence during the fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray area are two examples of this gap.67 The AU’s power has also gone down in the central Sahel. This is mostly because there hasn’t been a consistent political commitment to staff and give power to its regional offices to help solve conflicts.67 The AU has a big problem because it has to follow the Lomé Declaration, which says that states must be suspended after illegal transfers of administration. This is in line with democratic norms, but some African leaders are starting to realise that keeping lines of communication open with military governments is very important. This makes it hard for everyone to work together.67 This shows that the problem isn’t just a lack of resources; it’s also about how member states work together and prioritise turning continental goals into national action, which can be hard when national interests are at odds with each other. Such discrepancies directly undermine the efficacy of the normative frameworks.
3. The AU’s ability to deal with peace and security issues is always limited by a lack of resources (International Crisis Group [ICG] 2025). The AU Peace Fund was started in 1993 and then revived in 2018. Its goal is to provide long-term funding for peace and security projects, especially those that fight organised crime. The fund reached its initial goal of $400 million by mid-2024, mostly from member states. However, this is still far less than the huge cost of dealing with Africa’s wars (Soumahoro, 2025). Soumahoro (2025) says that the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) cost $1.5 billion a year in 2023. This shows how big the gap is between the money that is available and the needs of the mission. The AU and UN need to work together to fill the 25% burden-sharing gap left by UN Security Council Resolution 2719, which says that UN-assessed contributions can only cover 75% of AU-led peace assistance operations (Zeyede, 2025). This means that even with strong rules and guidelines, the AU can’t do large-scale, long-term anti-crime measures because it doesn’t have enough reliable money. This reliance on foreign funding and unpredictable internal contributions is a major threat to the AU’s ability to do its job. Also, it is still hard to fight some crimes, like human trafficking and smuggling migrants, because there aren’t enough resources to do so. This has a direct effect on how well intelligence sharing and operational responses can be funded.
4. African countries are very worried about not having enough resources. This is true in fields like digital forensics and electronic evidence. This is often because the technology infrastructure is weak, people don’t have enough digital skills, and they don’t have enough money (UN General Assembly, 2025). This means that even with laws in place, it is very hard to look into modern crimes like cybercrime. Coordination among various AU entities responsible for combating transnational organised crime continues to be hindered by resource limitations and insufficient horizontal integration (AmaniAfrica, 2025). This means that the digital and human infrastructure needed to fight cross-border crime is not good enough, which gives criminal networks a chance to take advantage of operational weaknesses. Also, some people are said to be unwilling to share important information, which makes it harder to stop human trafficking and migrant smuggling (Development Policy and Performance Portal, 2025).

The operational responses and partnerships of the AU

1. The Continental Operational Centre (COC) for trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. A practical reaction to diverse forms of crime is illustrated by the formation of specialised operations centers. The Continental Operational Center (COC) for Trafficking in Persons (TIP) and Smuggling of Migrants (SOM), formed in 2019, is a significant part of Africa’s efforts to curb irregular migration (African Union, 2024b). A structured framework for collaboration between member states, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and law enforcement agencies was established in December 2024 when the COC validated continental guidelines for information and intelligence sharing to combat TIP and SOM, according to Development Policy and Performance Portal (2025). This shows that the AU is developing specific operational institutions in order to move beyond broad mandates, realising that complex situations require specialised expertise and a coordinated response.
2.  Partnerships with UNODC, INTERPOL, and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). External collaboration and regional integration are vital force for the AU’s anti-crime initiatives. The AU works closely with international partners like UNODC and INTERPOL to promote police cooperation and counter transnational threats across the continent (INTERPOL. (n.d.)). The African Union and INTERPOL’s Special Representative Office in Addis Ababa work closely to establish synergies and ensuring that the law enforcement voice is heard in AU initiatives. The PSC has also recommended for coordinated actions with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), INTERPOL, and UNODC to identify and assess unlawful flows (AmaniAfrica, 2025). These partnerships offer vital operational support, information sharing, training, and technical assistance that the AU and its member nations frequently lack internally (UN General Assembly, 2025). Furthermore, the AU fosters the harmonisation and coordination of activities between regional mechanisms, such as the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs), and the AU itself, in the promotion of peace, security, and stability (ACCORD, 2024). RECs are vital for establishing constraints against tiny firearms and light weapons.
3. The role of AFRIPOL’s initiatives and the Peace and Security Council (PSC): The PSC is responsible for managing, preventing, and resolving disputes and is the primary pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It has regularly expressed worry over the expansion of transnational organised crime in Africa (AmaniAfrica, 2025). A formal recognition and priority of the problem may be shown in the PSC’s 2019 decision to create an annual session on transnational organised crime as a standing agenda item. Also, AFRIPOL, founded as the continent’s law enforcement coordination mechanism, is a significant institutional framework designed to cope with transnational organised crime. It provides a framework for police coordination at strategic, tactical, and operational levels throughout African states (Soumahoro, 2025). The execution of “Operation TAPI,” a cross-border project carried out by AFRIPOL in collaboration with INTERPOL, is a concrete illustration of AFRIPOL’s impact on the ground. This program, which encompasses six AU member nations, tackles a variety of criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, pharmaceuticals, guns, counterfeit or smuggled commodities, and environmental crimes (AmaniAfrica, 2025).

Conclusion

In order to combat organised crime throughout the continent, the African Union has made impressive progress in creating a comprehensive normative framework. The OAU’s move from a non-interventionist position to a more aggressive and interventionist mandate reveals that the threat posed by transnational criminal networks has been clearly identified. Conventions against corruption, action plans for drug control, strategies for arms control, and protocols for human trafficking and cross-border cooperation are only a few of the various legal and policy tools that the AU has set up. International standards are often in line with these frameworks. This entails a knowledge at the continental level of the complex nature of organised crime and the need for a multi-sectoral response.  However, a number of practical restrictions, similar as resource shortages and the continuous lack of genuine and sustained political will among member states, regularly test the usefulness of these normative frameworks. Operational vulnerabilities brought about by a lack of expertise in areas like digital forensics and an unwillingness to share intelligence are easily exploited by criminal networks. Cross-border law enforcement entails jurisdictional complexity and challenges due to the inherent tension between national sovereignty and the transnational nature of crime. This makes coordinated action tougher. Consequently, the practical realities on the ground create a huge gap between desire and achievement, even while the AU’s normative frameworks offer a solid foundation and demonstrate a deep grasp of the organised crime problem. The symbiotic relationship between organised crime and violence, fuelled by illegal economies and socio-economic deficiencies, further distorts the image.

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