Using Cinema to Change Nigeria’s Environmental Policies through the Polluter Pays Principle in Environmental Assessment

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Ogbuke, M. U. (2026). Using Cinema to Change Nigeria’s Environmental Policies through the Polluter Pays Principle in Environmental Assessment. International Journal of Research, 13(3), 30–40. https://doi.org/10.26643/ijr/3

Ogbuke, Martha Uchenna

Department of Sociology and Anthropology,

Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Enugu State University of Science and Technology, Agbani

Email: uche.ogbuke@esut.edu.ng

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0006-9055-565X

ABSTRACT

Nigeria’s environmental crisis demands quick policy reforms since it is caused by gas flaring, oil spills, and loose application of the polluter pays principle (PPP). This article explores how Cinema, Nigeria’s influential film sector, may magnify public awareness and motivate government to execute the PPP efficiently. Cinema underutilises environmental campaigning despite its global reach, frequently oversimplifying systemic issues or avoiding criticisms of institutional and corporate accountability. This study identifies limitations in PPP enforcement and opportunities for storytelling to reframe pollution as a solvable injustice. Corporate influence, weak institutions, and cultural narratives normalising environmental degradation further inhibit development. These problems are made worse by international streaming services, which prioritise entertainment over action, weakening crucial messages. The article concludes that Nigerians and people around the world can be motivated to seek a cleaner, more equitable future by using cinema’s storytelling power.

KEYWORDS: Cinema, Environmental policy, Policy framework, Environmental degradation

INTRODUCTION

There is an immediate need to address the environmental conditions in various sections of Nigeria. Oil spills have harmed farmlands and water sources. People have trouble breathing due to the toxic pollutants from gas flaring (Tran, 2024). The terrain is becoming desolate and susceptible to erosion due to the startling rate at which forests are being destroyed. These concerns are not only environmental, they effect people’s lives. Homes are lost by families. Farmers cannot grow crops. Children drink contaminated water. The harm is prevalent, and it continues growing worse. The “polluter pays principle” (PPP) is a solution that has succeeded elsewhere. It states that those who cause pollution should foot the bill for cleanup (Al Kamzari, 2024). This principle is part of international regulations and agreements. But in Nigeria, it remains more of a theory than a reality. Businesses continue to pollute without facing severe consequences. Although laws are in place, they are not well enforced. People suffer while polluters are unpunished.


But there’s hope. Cinema, Nigeria’s burgeoning film industry, might hold the key to change. The Nigerian Patriotriot (2024) claims that the film industry is the second biggest globally. Its films are seen throughout Africa and beyond. The stories usually depict issues that exist in real life, such as injustice, corruption, and poverty. Cinema has a way of connecting with people. It speaks their language, literally and figuratively.


This essay explores how films can help put the polluter pays principle into practice. Telling stories about pollution and its implications, filmmakers can promote awareness. They can illustrate the human cost of environmental catastrophe. And they may pressure leaders to enforce rules that defend the environment. The objective is to convert Cinema’s storytelling power into a weapon for policy change. Nigeria’s environmental predicament is complicated. It involves oil businesses, government agencies, and local communities. However, it is fundamentally about equity. Why should poor farmers bear any of the costs associated with oil spills? Why should children suffer because of gas flaring? The polluter pays principle offers a way to remedy these inequities. And Cinema may play a part in making that happen.
Cinema’s significance cannot be emphasised. Every day, millions of Nigerians watch its films. They are presented on TVs, phones, and in impromptu cinemas. According to Iheka (2013), Cinema creates stories that resonate with regular people. It acknowledges their struggles and honours their resiliency. Social issues like inequality and corruption are already covered in a lot of films. So why not the environment? Think of a movie that shows the impact of an oil spill on a fishing village. As the rivers turn dark, the narrative can revolve on a family losing their source of subsistence. Imagine watching a film on gas flaring, where the smoke causes respiratory issues in children. These tales are true in places like the Niger Delta; they are not made up. However, when presented in a movie, they become effective instruments for transformation.
Cinema has the potential to stimulate conversations. It can make people worry about topics they might otherwise dismiss. Additionally, when people care, they put pressure on lawmakers to take action, laws are upheld, and change is made possible. Environmental deterioration is not solely Nigeria’s problem; it is a worldwide issue. Deforestation contributes to climate change, and pollution kills millions worldwide every year (Leon et al., 2022). Everyone agrees that the polluter pays concept is a just way to deal with these issues. However, execution differs from nation to nation.


The lack of enforcement in Nigeria results from a number of problems. Corruption plays a big impact, and so does the influence of powerful corporations. Local communities frequently lack the resources to fight back because they are left to deal with the consequences alone (Babatunde, 2020). Cinema may help shift the scales by bringing attention to these problems, which will ultimately empower communities. This imbalance needs to be corrected. It can inspire campaigners. It may even shame firms into doing the right thing because stories have power; They alter how we see the world.

CINEMA’S UNREALISED POTENTIAL FOR POLICY ADVOCACY

Cinema’s films are seen across Africa and beyond. They shape how individuals think about issues like corruption, love, and family struggles. But when it comes to environmental challenges, Cinema has not really been at the front burner. Pollution, oil spills, and gas flaring are rarely central issues. Even when films touch on these subjects, they just touch the surface. For example, a movie can blame a greedy “oil boss” for destroying a hamlet. Dramatic storytelling results from this, but it sidesteps more important issues. Who permits these bosses to function? Why do laws fail to stop pollution? These structural issues go unexplored. Viewers see a villain, but they don’t understand how laws could make actual organisations answerable.
This matters because stories impact beliefs. Cultivation theory states that frequent exposure to media alters how people interpret the world (Lai, 2015). If films only depict bad people doing terrible things, viewers might believe that punishing “bad guys” is the solution to pollution. They will not understand the necessity for systemic changes, including enforcing the polluter pays principle (PPP). Cinema has the tools to change this. Its films thrive on relatable characters and local concerns. Imagine a narrative about a community opposing an oil firm. A character might explain how gas flaring violates people’s health rights, or the narrative could demonstrate how inadequate fines absolve polluters. These tales could drive public demand for policy action.
But Cinema generally avoids such complexity. Environmental issues are downplayed or reduced to basic good-vs-evil narratives. This reflects a broader trend: filmmakers focus on commercial drama rather than sophisticated advocacy (Khitrov, 2024). There is no denying the industry’s reach. Cinema films are accessible, affordable, and enjoyed widely, even in remote locations. They fill in literacy and linguistic deficiencies. However, this authority is not used to advance environmental justice.

 
However, there are exceptions. Some films touch on oil pollution’s repercussions, such Black November (2012), which exposes Niger Delta difficulties. However, these are uncommon. Most stories lack substance or actionable answers. This gap is a squandered opportunity. By making pollution a household issue, films might put pressure on decision-makers. If audiences connect environmental harm to policy failings, they might demand tighter enforcement of the PPP. Filmmakers could cooperate with activists or agencies like NOSDRA to assure accuracy. They could also illustrate real situations when the PPP worked or failed. A movie might, for example, compare a town that receives compensation for oil spills (per PPP) with another that suffers because of corruption.


It is crucial to additionally highlight that discussing systemic concerns risks reaction from influential industries. Filmmakers may worry about censorship or financial loss. Nevertheless, the promise remains. Cinema has influenced cultural perceptions before. It normalised conversations about HIV/AIDS and gender injustice through cinema. Environmental policy may experience the same thing (Mango, 2023). To do this, filmmakers need to transcend beyond basic villains. They must show how institutions, not just individuals, enable pollution. This calls for investigation, bravery, and expert cooperation. The payoff might be significant. A compelling narrative about the costs of pollution might inspire communities, embarrass businesses, and compel legislators to take action. Cinema’s storytelling power might take the polluter pays principle from a nebulous idea into a reality.

WEAK ENFORCEMENT WEAKENS POLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE

It seems nonetheless that the Nigeria’s environmental laws theoretically support the polluter pays principle (PPP). The concept is clear: individuals who cause pollution must bear cleanup costs and compensate sufferers. But in practice, this rule exists primarily on paper. Consider oil spills. Companies like Shell or Chevron often pay little to nothing for destroying land and water (Josiah & Akpuh, 2022). Fines are lowand infrequently enforced. Even when organisations like the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) issue penalties, corporations ignore them (Amnesty International, 2020). They realise the government lacks the power or motivation

 to collect.
Agencies supposed to enforce PPP are underfunded and understaffed. For instance, NOSDRA finds it difficult to keep an eye on oil-rich areas like the Niger Delta. They rely on antiquated equipment and have limited workers to inspect thousands of kilometres of pipes. Communities have to wait years for assistance when spills occur. Crops are lost by farmers. Rivers become black, and fishermen watch. Yet polluters face no actual penalties. Victims are also let down by the system. Although PPP mandates that businesses pay impacted communities (Aragão, 2022), this rarely occurs. study by Ojum (2025) demonstrates that oil spill victims in the Niger Delta rarely received any reimbursement. Families are stuck in poverty as a result of several lawsuits that drag on in court for decades.


However, the issue is more complex. The Nigerian government frequently contributes to pollution. State-owned refineries and pipelines leak often, yet no agency holds them accountable. This double standard diminishes public trust. If the government ignores its own regulations, why should corporations obey? Weak enforcement produces a loop of harm. Companies consider fines as a minor cost of doing business. Study found that oil businesses in Nigeria spend more on legal expenditures to delay penalties than on actual cleanup (Olujobi, 2023). Meanwhile, pollution worsens. Gas flaring – a practice forbidden in many nations, persists unchecked, contaminating the air and causing respiratory ailments.


Communities are left to cope. Villagers in certain Niger Delta states drink from oil-coated ponds. Children in Rivers State play near rusted pipelines. These stories are widespread, nevertheless, they do not generate headlines rapidly. Without enforcement, PPP is a hollow promise. The lack of political will is clear. According to Olalekan et al. (2019), environmental authorities are frequently underfunded to the point of being irrelevant. A 2023 audit revealed that NOSDRA’s budget was less than 1% of what oil corporations paid in annual taxes. This mismatch ensures that polluters stay in control.


Even when laws are changed, implementation lags. Stricter fines for gas flaring were part of Nigeria’s 2022 Petroleum Industry Act (Borha & Olujobi, 2023). But as of 2025, no corporation has been penalised under the new guidelines. This indicates that laws alone cannot remedy systematic neglect. The ramifications of this failure are worldwide. Nigeria’s oil sector fuels climate change, although the country’s environmental rules are among the least implemented in Africa (Elenwo & Akankali, 2014). The polluter pays idea, a cornerstone of worldwide sustainability efforts, is reduced to a catchphrase here. Until enforcement improves, communities will keep paying the price. Farmers will lose livelihoods; children will drink polluted water; and businesses will keep earning, knowing they can pollute without paying.

GLOBAL STREAMING PLATFORMS AS DOUBLE-EDGED SWORDS

Nigerian stories are now accessible to viewers throughout the world thanks to worldwide streaming services like Netflix, Amazon Prime, and iRokotv. These technologies give unequalled access, with many Nigerian filmmakers currently distributing films directly through streaming sites (Simon, 2022). Movies that were previously only available in local theatres or on unauthorised DVDs are now shown in Europe, Asia and the Americas. This shift has boosted Cinema’s global popularity, with platforms aggressively pushing African stories as part of their content ambitions (Jedlowski, 2022). But this visibility comes at a cost. In order to appeal to a wider audience, streaming services frequently dilute environmental concerns in favour of entertainment value over action. For example, a film showing oil spills in the Niger Delta can focus on interpersonal conflict or personal resilience rather than systemic corporate misconduct. This sanitisation strips questions of their political urgency. A nasty “oil boss” becomes an easy scapegoat, while systemic problems like poor application of the polluter pays principle (PPP), remain unchecked.

 
The impulse to sanitise stems from platform algorithms and audience expectations. Global viewers often seek amusement or relatable drama, not gloomy exposés of environmental devastation. According to a 2024 study, films with “universal themes”—such love and family—trend higher on Netflix Nigeria than films with specialised subjects, including gas flaring (Ndu, 2024). Filmmakers, in turn, develop content to gain spots on selected lists like “Top 10 in Nigeria,” which ensure publicity.

 
This dynamic risks reducing Cinema’s potential to push legislative change. While films might humanise environmental calamities, their muted critiques fail to hold institutions accountable. For instance, a movie might represent a neighbourhood suffering from polluted water without naming the corporations involved or denouncing low fines (e.g., $2 per 1,000 cubic feet for gas flaring). Audiences identify with characters but remain oblivious of the underlying reasons of their sorrow. Streaming platforms also implement indirect censorship. To retain agreements with advertisers or sponsors associated to extractive industries, platforms may deprioritize films that criticise corporate activity.


However, there are opposing opportunities because to the growth of direct-to-streaming delivery. By uploading videos to websites like YouTube or Kwese TV, independent filmmakers get beyond conventional gatekeepers. These producers generally challenge environmental injustice more openly, leveraging viral algorithms to attract niche audiences. It may be stated that streaming’s “double-edged sword” paralleled Cinema’s bigger ambiguities. The sector relies on worldwide collaborations but risks losing its local identity. To maximum impact, filmmakers must balance market demands with advocacy. Collaborations with environmental NGOs might promote documentaries that blend storytelling with valuable data. For instance, a video co-produced with Nigeria’s Health of Mother Earth Foundation can use real-life pollution numbers to anchor its story and make the PPP’s significance evident.

CULTURAL NARRATIVES NORMALISE DAMAGE TO THE ENVIRONMENT

Polluted landscapes are frequently shown in films as unavoidable aspects of everyday life. Scenes like oily rivers, smoke-filled sky, or bleak farmlands abound in films without critique. These graphics provide a subtle message that environmental devastation is routine, inescapable, and beyond human control. For example, films based in the Niger Delta, such The Liquid Black Gold (2010), portray communities living among oil spills and gas flares. However, these situations are hardly ever presented as unfair. Instead, they are depicted as impartial backdrops to human drama. This normalisation has real-world effects. When audiences frequently see pollution portrayed as “just the way things are,” they tend to accept it as unchangeable. According to a study examining the influence of cinema, films influence how people see social reality, particularly in oral cultures where public discourse is dominated by narrative (Frank, 2017). Through the lack of critiques of polluters or remedies like the PPP, Cinema unwittingly reinforces resignation. Communities come to believe that they are solely responsible for the costs associated with pollution.

 
But this is not just a backdrop, it’s a choice. Consider Oloibiri (2016), a film about Nigeria’s first oil well. It exposes how oil production ruined a Niger Delta hamlet, although the story focuses on human suffering rather than structural accountability. The story generates pity but stops short of critiquing practices that help businesses dodge responsibility. This resonates with broader tendencies where Cinema typically personalises environmental harm, condemning “bad actors” instead of investigating broken institutions. Even cultural emblems are co-opted. Some films depict deities or ancestral spirits related to trees and rivers, casting environmental loss as a spiritual catastrophe. While this adds emotional weight, it also risks shifting blame to supernatural forces, while absolving human decision-makers. For instance, if a dirty river is perceived as a god’s curse, viewers may feel powerless to demand cleanup efforts.
These narratives’ lack of urgency reflects Nigeria’s policy lethargy. When films portray pollution as background noise, they mirror a society where fines for gas flaring remain modest ($2 per 1,000 cubic feet) and authorities like NOSDRA lack enforcement ability. Audiences internalise this existing quo. A research on media influence highlights that film images of corruption and poverty shape viewers’ assumption that this is how the world operates (Keenaghan, & Reilly, 2017).


Nevertheless, Cinema’s storytelling potential could alter this loop. Imagine videos that contrast images of responsibility with contaminated landscapes. A scene depicting a town successfully suing an oil firm, or a regulator actually collecting fines may reframe pollution as a solved problem. This corresponds with the PPP’s underlying notion that harm is not inevitable, and polluters must pay. These stories humanise the situation, making abstract solutions like the PPP feel essential. For example, a character calculating medical expenditures from breathing harmful vapours could cause outrage that forces officials to act.

 
The difficulty lies in striking a balance between amusement and criticism. Relatable stories, not lectures, are what make films so successful. But even modest alterations matter. Dinner table arguments could be sparked by a nasty politician who dismisses a spill cleanup. A plotline about a whistleblower revealing corporate malfeasance can inspire real-world reporting. According to Finney (2018), Cultural narratives are not static. They change when storytellers choose to challenge, not just reflect, existing standards. Reframing environmental degradation as a human-made catastrophe, and the PPP as a vehicle for justice; Cinema may turn passive audiences into champions. The purpose is not to lecture but to spark the thinking on why are we accepting this and what can we do to change it.

CONCLUSION

Nigeria’s environmental catastrophe demands urgent response. The PPP offers a path forward, but its success depends on public pressure and political resolve. Cinema, with its cultural influence, may bridge the gap between policy and practice by making environmental justice accessible and significant. Movies have the capacity to humanise difficult themes. They can show the real faces of those affected by pollution, such as towns suffocating on poisonous air, farmers losing their land, and kids drinking contaminated water. By doing this, directors are able to transform the storyline from impersonal laws to relevant personal tales. This emotional connection is vital to generating change.


But cinema can’t achieve it by itself. For the industry to have the most impact, filmmakers must collaborate with environmental experts, activists, and politicians. Together, they can ensure that the stories conveyed are not only compelling but also genuine and actionable. This partnership might lead to films that teach while they delight, prompting conversations that push for accountability. Another level of possibilities is created by the global reach of services like Netflix. While these platforms often put entertainment above activism, they also offer a chance to communicate Nigeria’s environmental challenges to foreign audiences. A well-crafted film may throw a focus on crises like gas flaring or oil spills, drawing global attention and potentially pressuring corporations and governments to act.


However, troubles remain. The PPP’s implementation is nevertheless impeded by corporate involvement and insufficient enforcement. Cinema itself faces risks if it takes on huge industries. However, history reveals that storytelling has always been a means of bringing about social change. From literature to entertainment, stories have shaped how communities view injustice and create solutions. In the end, the objective is clear: to make environmental justice a common duty. Cinema’s contribution in this endeavour is both distinctive and vital. Through the employment of its storytelling power, the industry can persuade Nigerians, and the globe to demand a cleaner, fairer future.

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Exploring the Place of the AU in Fighting Organised Crime in Africa

Daily writing prompt
What experiences in life helped you grow the most?

Citation

Nwokoroeze, C. N. (2026). Exploring the Place of the AU in Fighting Organised Crime in Africa. International Journal of Research, 13(3), 18–29. https://doi.org/10.26643/ijr/2

Nwokoroeze, Chinonye Nnenna 

Department of Political Science,

Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Enugu State University of Science and Technology, Agbani Email: chinonye.nwokoroeze@esut.edu.ng  

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0008-0449-9036

Abstract

The African continent faces a persistent and expanding threat from organised crime. These criminal networks operate across borders, harming peace, security, and economy. The AU  has taken on a critical mission to address these complex concerns. A rising understanding of the interdependence of stability and development throughout the continent is reflected in its shift from a non-interventionist stance to a more proactive involvement in peace and security. This article addresses the AU’s initiatives to prevent organised crime, analysing its established normative frameworks and the practical restrictions that often hinder its usefulness. The study employs a qualitative technique, drawing on secondary data from official AU publications, United Nations reports, and academic literature. The study contends that even though the AU has created a wide range of legal and policy tools, their influence is usually diminished by barriers to cross-border collaboration, a lack of persistent political commitment, and a lack of financial and technical resources. The conclusion emphasises the ongoing disconnect between idealistic aspirations and practical reality. It promotes enhancing the AU’s participation in the fight against organised crime by encouraging greater political resolve and improved resource mobilisation.

Keywords: AU, Organized Crime, Threat, Resources mobilization, United Nations

Introduction

The paper used a 2024 UNODC research to show that organised crime makes violence worse in places like the Sahel and is a vital source of cash for people who are economically challenged. This means that organised crime is not merely a business; it is firmly ingrained in the social and economic institutions of some communities, which makes it a very tough problem to overcome. For example, the drug problem is a concern in all five African regions. The continent has become a key transit route, user, and source for drugs including cocaine and heroin. (2019, the African Union).
The United Nations (2025) said that human trafficking is a severe violation of human rights. It is a sort of modern-day slavery in which traffickers target people who are weak, like those who are poor, in conflict, or displaced. A lot of people are trafficked across borders from Africa, and this is often linked to war, being forced to leave home, and poverty (Tefera, 2019). Illicit financial flows (IFFs) make these difficulties worse by taking $88.6 billion out of Africa’s economy every year, which is 3.7% of the continent’s gross domestic product (GDP) (United Nations, 2021). These outflows make it hard to make essential investments in education, health, and productive sectors, which keeps the cycle of underdevelopment running. Because these problems are connected, organised crime is both a cause of conflict and an indication of underdevelopment. The money earned from unlawful operations promotes wars and degrades institutions and democracy (Thelma et al., 2024). At the same time, the instability and poverty that result from these activities make it easier for criminal networks to emerge as a way to live. This makes things worse and worse.

The African Union (AU) formally takes the place of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 2002. The AU was formed up by the Constitutive Act in 2000 (Maluwa, 2012). This transition was a huge step away from the OAU’s stance of not becoming involved and toward a more comprehensive and collective action approach to peace, security, and stability on the continent (ACCORD, 2024). The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the African Union’s key body for making decisions about how to stop, handle, and settle disputes. This is a fundamental feature of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (African Union [AU]). The PSC is quite powerful. It can stop and avoid wars, make peace, build peace, approve peace support missions, and deal with challenges including unconstitutional changes of government and transnational organised crime (ACCORD, 2024).


This amendment in the AU’s mission illustrates that there is an increasing, albeit tough, commitment to proactive security governance. Organised crime is a significant security concern, as evidenced by the PSC’s 2019 decision to make a yearly conference on transnational organised crime a permanent agenda item (AmaniAfrica, 2025). However, the fact that this annual session has not been consistently held since its institutionalisation, last meeting in May 2022, and the general problems mentioned with the PSC’s reactive approach and slow response (ACCORD, 2024), show that while the normative framework is in place, the political will and practical application to fully realise this proactive mandate are still not consistent. This illustrates the fundamental argument of this article—that there is a discrepancy between the declared purpose and what actually occurs. This article’s objective is to examine the African Union’s regulations for combating organised crime and identify the obstacles to its complete implementation. It examines the various forms of organised crime that are prevalent in Africa, the AU’s legal and policy instruments, the issues that arise when these instruments are applied, and the collaborations and initiatives taken to combat these threats.

A full collection of legal and policy tools of the AU

  1. The Assembly’s Special Declaration on Illicit Financial Flows (2015). This declaration committed AU leaders to eliminating persistent illicit financial flows and guaranteeing the recovery of lost financial resources to Africa to support the continent’s development agenda. It called for African institutions and skills to be improved in areas like recovering stolen property, collecting taxes, and making contracts (United Nations, 2021).
  2. The African Union’s Constitutive Act, which was passed in 2000, replaced the OAU Charter. This marked a big change in how the continent deals with peace and security (Maluwa, 2012). The OAU was mostly based on the idea that its member states shouldn’t interfere in each other’s internal affairs. This made it hard for the OAU to deal with internal crises or problems with governance (UNODC, 2018). The AU, on the other hand, gave the “right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (African Union, 2000, p. 9). This development provided a more robust legal foundation for the AU to actively address peace and security issues, particularly those concerning transnational organised crime.
  3. The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC, 2003). This convention, which was signed in Maputo, shows that everyone in the region agrees on how to stop, punish, and encourage international cooperation in the fight against corruption. It includes a wide range of crimes, such as bribery, illegal enrichment, money laundering, and asset recovery (African Union, 2024a). It also calls for the end of corruption in both the public and private sectors (African Union, 2003). As of January 2020, 43 states had signed this agreement.
  4. The African Union Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (AUPA, 2019–2023). This strategy framework, which is the fifth of its kind, promotes a balanced, integrated, and multi-sectoral approach to drug control and crime prevention. It is based on what happened at the 2016 UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the world’s drug problem. The AUPA has a lot of different ways to cut down on drug use and supply, stop crime, reform the criminal justice system, and work together with other countries to stop drug trafficking, guns, corruption, and money laundering (African Union, 2019).
  5. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, which was signed in 2002, made the AU’s security role more effective (ACCORD, 2024). Karahalios (Karahalios, 2021) says that the PSC was set up to be the main group that makes decisions about how to stop, handle, and solve conflicts. Its mission is to deal with new dangers, like international organised crime. This change in the law from non-interference to interventionism creates the necessary normative space for anti-crime action. This lets the AU see and treat problems like organised crime as threats to peace and security on the continent. Without this basic change, many of the later anti-crime agreements would not have a clear legal basis for continental involvement. It is important to create this normative space, but it is not enough on its own because other things are needed to make it happen.
  6. The African Union’s 2013 plan for controlling the illegal spread, circulation, and trafficking of small arms and light weapons. The goal of this plan is to stop, stop, and completely get rid of the illegal spread of SALW across all of Africa. AmaniAfrica (2022) says that it is focused on building capacity, getting stakeholders to work together and coordinate better, and improving international aid.
  7. The Ouagadougou Action Plan to Stop Human Trafficking, Especially for Women and Children (2006). The goal of this strategy is to create general guidelines for fighting human trafficking, raise awareness and prevention, protect and help victims, put in place the right legal frameworks, improve law enforcement, and encourage cooperation. It stresses a “three-pronged strategy” of Prevention, Protection, and Prosecution d) Niamey Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation (2014). This was put in place to encourage cooperation between countries and the peaceful resolution of border disputes. This convention also says that countries should work together to stop piracy, terrorism, and cross-border crime. It needs 15 countries to sign it before it can go into effect (African Union, 2024a).
  8. The Assembly’s Special Declaration on Illicit Financial Flows (2015). This declaration committed AU leaders to eliminating persistent illicit financial flows and guaranteeing the recovery of lost financial resources to Africa to support the continent’s development agenda. It called for African institutions and skills to be improved in areas like recovering stolen property, collecting taxes, and making contracts (United Nations, 2021).

The evolving environment of transnational organised crime in Africa

Illegal use of natural resources: UNODC (2025) claims that organised crime groups play a major role in illicit gold mining, which harms the environment and is fuelled by money laundering, fraud, and corruption. Trafficking in wildlife is also a big problem. Perche et al. (2020) say that organised crime groups that make money off of endangered species are often involved. Organised crime relies heavily on taking advantage of natural resources, which makes environmental problems and problems with governance worse. This shows that illegally taking resources can be a big source of income for criminal gangs, which means that environmental crimes and financial crimes that weaken government control are linked. So, strong management of the natural resource sectors and dealing with the social and economic factors that make people want to illegally exploit resources are both important parts of successful counter-TOC efforts.


Drug trafficking
: The United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (2024) says that West and Central Africa are becoming important places for cocaine and heroin to pass through on their way to Europe. These drugs often come from South America and Afghanistan. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) World Drug Report 2020, cocaine seizures in Africa rose by 66% in 2018 and were expected to rise even more in 2019. This shows that Africa is becoming more important as a transit region (UNODC, 2020). This shows that the problem is getting worse because the continent is now a growing market and supply for illegal drugs, as well as a transit hub. For instance, Nigeria and South Africa have shut down illegal methamphetamine labs (UNODC, 2020). The study also found that tramadol, an opioid that isn’t monitored by any international body, is a serious public health issue, especially in West and Central Africa, where it was responsible for 79% of all seizures in 2018. This change in Africa’s role in the global drug market from mainly a transit point to also a place where drugs are made and used means that counter-narcotics strategies must now be multi-faceted, with the goal of fighting both supply and demand on the continent.


Illicit financial flows (IFFs): It noted that the significant loss, amounting to 3.7% of the continent’s GDP, hinders development and exacerbates poverty and inequality. IFFs are closely linked to other illegal activities, like drug trafficking, human trafficking, and selling weapons illegally (African Union, 2024a). These flows are a major roadblock to African development and a major facilitator of other organised crimes. They make conflicts worse and get in the way of sustainable development by weakening institutions and democracy, shrinking the tax base, and taking important resources away from public services like healthcare and education (African Union, 2024a). The estimated $88.6 billion lost each year is a sign of lost opportunities for growth, lost jobs, and rising poverty. This means that fighting IFFs is not only important for keeping money safe, but it is also necessary for long-term growth and stopping crime.

Smuggling migrants and trafficking people : Human trafficking is a serious violation of human rights that is often called “modern-day According to UNODC (2024a), Africa is the source of the most destinations, both inside and outside the continent. One-third of all cross-border human trafficking flows involve people from Africa. The data shows that the number of child victims is alarmingly rising. In Africa in 2022, kids made up 38% of all victims found. Traffickers use technology to lure victims by working online and using social media and encrypted communication tools (United Nations, 2025). This digital growth of human trafficking is scary because it lets criminal groups reach more people and take advantage of them more easily. This shows that technology can be both helpful and harmful, as it can be used by criminals in new ways. Because of this, cybersecurity and digital forensics must be part of anti-trafficking efforts. But the strong link to vulnerable groups shows that technology fixes alone aren’t enough. It’s still important to deal with the root causes of vulnerability, like poverty and violence.

Bringing weapons into the country illegally: Firearms trafficking is a major cause of conflicts, especially in places like the Sahel (AmaniAfrica, 2025). UNODC (2024) says that most of the guns that are trafficked illegally come from legitimate manufacturers but are sold on the black market. This highlights a critical area for intervention. It means that illegal arms trafficking is the most profitable illegal business, allowing organised crime groups to protect their illegal businesses and employees. It is not just a crime on its own; it is also a key part of the whole criminal ecosystem, which includes drug trafficking and illegal use of natural resources. So, limiting the flow of weapons is a good way to break up organised crime groups and bring about peace.

Challenges confronting the AU

  1. Different national laws and rules could make it very hard for regions to work together to fight organised crime. To get around these legal problems, it is important to make national laws more similar and adopt universal standards. This is a big legal problem for transnational crime because criminals take advantage of gaps in jurisdiction. The Niamey Convention aims to promote integrated border management and cross-border cooperation (Cassidy-Neumiller et al., 2024). The University for Peace (2022) says that Africa is a good place for illegal businesses and organised crime because of its porous borders and areas that are not controlled. Criminal groups use these open borders to start their activities in very organised and complicated ways, which makes the borders unsafe. Another problem with international cooperation in criminal cases is that people don’t work together when there aren’t any relevant bilateral agreements (UN General Assembly, 2025). It is hard to get mutual legal aid agreements, which makes it hard to prosecute criminals across borders even when they are found. This means that even though the AU has ways for member states to work together, it is often hard to put them into action because of the rights of each member state and the problems that come with enforcing laws across borders. There is a natural conflict between national sovereignty and the international nature of crime that causes legal and practical problems.
  2.  Even though AU leaders have promised to do better, they have shown a “persistent lack of genuine and sustained political will,” which has made it hard for them to deal with important problems, such as armed conflicts that hurt civilians and widespread attacks on basic rights (ICG, 2025). The AU’s response to crises is often inconsistent, and sometimes they use the principle of subsidiarity to regional authorities as an excuse not to act.70 There is a big difference between what the AU says it will do and what the member states are actually doing to make it happen and pay for it.  The chaotic running of the Sudanese civil war, where strong African leadership was badly needed but never happened, and the AU Commission’s silence during the fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray area are two examples of this gap.67 The AU’s power has also gone down in the central Sahel. This is mostly because there hasn’t been a consistent political commitment to staff and give power to its regional offices to help solve conflicts.67 The AU has a big problem because it has to follow the Lomé Declaration, which says that states must be suspended after illegal transfers of administration. This is in line with democratic norms, but some African leaders are starting to realise that keeping lines of communication open with military governments is very important. This makes it hard for everyone to work together.67 This shows that the problem isn’t just a lack of resources; it’s also about how member states work together and prioritise turning continental goals into national action, which can be hard when national interests are at odds with each other. Such discrepancies directly undermine the efficacy of the normative frameworks.
  3. The AU’s ability to deal with peace and security issues is always limited by a lack of resources (International Crisis Group [ICG] 2025). The AU Peace Fund was started in 1993 and then revived in 2018. Its goal is to provide long-term funding for peace and security projects, especially those that fight organised crime. The fund reached its initial goal of $400 million by mid-2024, mostly from member states. However, this is still far less than the huge cost of dealing with Africa’s wars (Soumahoro, 2025). Soumahoro (2025) says that the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) cost $1.5 billion a year in 2023. This shows how big the gap is between the money that is available and the needs of the mission. The AU and UN need to work together to fill the 25% burden-sharing gap left by UN Security Council Resolution 2719, which says that UN-assessed contributions can only cover 75% of AU-led peace assistance operations (Zeyede, 2025). This means that even with strong rules and guidelines, the AU can’t do large-scale, long-term anti-crime measures because it doesn’t have enough reliable money. This reliance on foreign funding and unpredictable internal contributions is a major threat to the AU’s ability to do its job. Also, it is still hard to fight some crimes, like human trafficking and smuggling migrants, because there aren’t enough resources to do so. This has a direct effect on how well intelligence sharing and operational responses can be funded.
  4. African countries are very worried about not having enough resources. This is true in fields like digital forensics and electronic evidence. This is often because the technology infrastructure is weak, people don’t have enough digital skills, and they don’t have enough money (UN General Assembly, 2025). This means that even with laws in place, it is very hard to look into modern crimes like cybercrime. Coordination among various AU entities responsible for combating transnational organised crime continues to be hindered by resource limitations and insufficient horizontal integration (AmaniAfrica, 2025). This means that the digital and human infrastructure needed to fight cross-border crime is not good enough, which gives criminal networks a chance to take advantage of operational weaknesses. Also, some people are said to be unwilling to share important information, which makes it harder to stop human trafficking and migrant smuggling (Development Policy and Performance Portal, 2025).

The operational responses and partnerships of the AU

  1. The Continental Operational Centre (COC) for trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. A practical reaction to diverse forms of crime is illustrated by the formation of specialised operations centers. The Continental Operational Center (COC) for Trafficking in Persons (TIP) and Smuggling of Migrants (SOM), formed in 2019, is a significant part of Africa’s efforts to curb irregular migration (African Union, 2024b). A structured framework for collaboration between member states, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and law enforcement agencies was established in December 2024 when the COC validated continental guidelines for information and intelligence sharing to combat TIP and SOM, according to Development Policy and Performance Portal (2025). This shows that the AU is developing specific operational institutions in order to move beyond broad mandates, realising that complex situations require specialised expertise and a coordinated response.
  2.  Partnerships with UNODC, INTERPOL, and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). External collaboration and regional integration are vital force for the AU’s anti-crime initiatives. The AU works closely with international partners like UNODC and INTERPOL to promote police cooperation and counter transnational threats across the continent (INTERPOL. (n.d.)). The African Union and INTERPOL’s Special Representative Office in Addis Ababa work closely to establish synergies and ensuring that the law enforcement voice is heard in AU initiatives. The PSC has also recommended for coordinated actions with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), INTERPOL, and UNODC to identify and assess unlawful flows (AmaniAfrica, 2025). These partnerships offer vital operational support, information sharing, training, and technical assistance that the AU and its member nations frequently lack internally (UN General Assembly, 2025). Furthermore, the AU fosters the harmonisation and coordination of activities between regional mechanisms, such as the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs), and the AU itself, in the promotion of peace, security, and stability (ACCORD, 2024). RECs are vital for establishing constraints against tiny firearms and light weapons.
  3. The role of AFRIPOL’s initiatives and the Peace and Security Council (PSC): The PSC is responsible for managing, preventing, and resolving disputes and is the primary pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It has regularly expressed worry over the expansion of transnational organised crime in Africa (AmaniAfrica, 2025). A formal recognition and priority of the problem may be shown in the PSC’s 2019 decision to create an annual session on transnational organised crime as a standing agenda item. Also, AFRIPOL, founded as the continent’s law enforcement coordination mechanism, is a significant institutional framework designed to cope with transnational organised crime. It provides a framework for police coordination at strategic, tactical, and operational levels throughout African states (Soumahoro, 2025). The execution of “Operation TAPI,” a cross-border project carried out by AFRIPOL in collaboration with INTERPOL, is a concrete illustration of AFRIPOL’s impact on the ground. This program, which encompasses six AU member nations, tackles a variety of criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, pharmaceuticals, guns, counterfeit or smuggled commodities, and environmental crimes (AmaniAfrica, 2025).

Conclusion

In order to combat organised crime throughout the continent, the African Union has made impressive progress in creating a comprehensive normative framework. The OAU’s move from a non-interventionist position to a more aggressive and interventionist mandate reveals that the threat posed by transnational criminal networks has been clearly identified. Conventions against corruption, action plans for drug control, strategies for arms control, and protocols for human trafficking and cross-border cooperation are only a few of the various legal and policy tools that the AU has set up. International standards are often in line with these frameworks. This entails a knowledge at the continental level of the complex nature of organised crime and the need for a multi-sectoral response.  However, a number of practical restrictions, similar as resource shortages and the continuous lack of genuine and sustained political will among member states, regularly test the usefulness of these normative frameworks. Operational vulnerabilities brought about by a lack of expertise in areas like digital forensics and an unwillingness to share intelligence are easily exploited by criminal networks. Cross-border law enforcement entails jurisdictional complexity and challenges due to the inherent tension between national sovereignty and the transnational nature of crime. This makes coordinated action tougher. Consequently, the practical realities on the ground create a huge gap between desire and achievement, even while the AU’s normative frameworks offer a solid foundation and demonstrate a deep grasp of the organised crime problem. The symbiotic relationship between organised crime and violence, fuelled by illegal economies and socio-economic deficiencies, further distorts the image.

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Interrogating the Nigeria Police Force and Its Counter-terrorism Approaches

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Citation

Egwu, F. O., Arua, M. C., Okeh, P. I., Onwe, D. C., & Onuoha, O. O. (2026). Interrogating the Nigeria Police Force and Its Counter-terrorism Approaches. International Journal of Research, 13(3), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.26643/ijr/1

1Egwu, Francis Ogbonnia

Department of Criminology and Security Studies,

Alex Ekwueme Federal University, Ndufu-Alike, Ebonyi State, Nigeria

Email: francis.egwu@funai.edu.ng

ORCID:  https://orcid.org/0009-0009-8519-8303

2**Arua, Mercy Chioma***

Department of Criminology and Security Studies,

Alex Ekwueme Federal University, Ndufu-Alike, Ebonyi State, Nigeria

Email: mercy.arua@funai.edu.ng

Corresponding author****

ORCID:  https://orcid.org/0009-0005-6625-477X

3Okeh, Peter Igboke

Department of Criminology and Security Studies,

Alex Ekwueme Federal University, Ndufu-Alike, Ebonyi State, Nigeria

Email: ptrgbk@gmail.com 

ORCID:  https://orcid.org/0009-0007-5991-8560

4Daniel Chidiebere Onwe

Department of Criminology and Security Studies,

Alex Ekwueme Federal University, Ndufu-Alike, Ebonyi State, Nigeria

Email: onwedaniel1990@gmail.com 

ORCID:  https://orcid.org/0009-0003-4168-148X

5Onuoha, Ogobuchi Onuoha

Department of Sociology,

Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki, Nigeria

Email: onuohaogobuchi@gmail.com  

ORCID:  https://orcid.org/0009-0008-1011-2168

Abstract

The paper used a theoretical method to look at how the Nigeria Police are involved in counter-terrorism efforts in Nigeria. It aimed to find out how the police participate, how effective their involvement is, and what can be done to improve their performance in these operations. The structural functionalism theory was adopted to theoretically underpin the study. The outcome of the study reveals that the police force plays a variety of roles which manifest in different forms in the fight against terrorism. These forms are not limited to intelligence gathering, synergy with other sister agencies, liaison with community leaders to fish out terrorist enclaves and so on. The study also revealed that the police’s regular use of overt force diminishes the effectiveness of their operations, as there is a need to fight the root cause of terrorism. The study recommends that the police should be specially trained on conflict resolution strategy while adopting the principle of community policing. To enhance counter-terrorism operational efficiency, the police should be given adequate and sophisticated equipment and, as well, undergo training and retraining to face the terrorist group.

Keywords: Police, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Police Operation, Nigeria                                              

Introduction

The Nigeria Police was established based on the provision of Section 214(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and several laws have given it responsibilities and authority (Nwauzi & Ogon, 2018). The force is tasked with the duties of investigating crimes, protecting people and property, and enforcing all laws and regulations. They may also be responsible for traffic control and prosecution in any court in the country. (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2000, as cited in Edet, 2017). The extant and primary law in Nigeria that highlights the specific responsibilities and capabilities of the Nigerian Police is the Police Act (Nwauzi & Ogon, 2018). The Nigeria Police also performs a variety of secondary responsibilities, including providing aid in times of need and managing and regulating highway traffic, among others (Madubuike-Ekwe & Obayemi, 2019). However, given the vast nature of police officers’ responsibilities and authority, the preceding list of police officer tasks and powers is not all-inclusive (Nwauzi & Ogon, 2018). The composition, establishment and operational control of the Police Force are clearly stated in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Section 214(1), that “There shall be a Police Force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this Section no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof” (CFRN, 1999). These provisions are reinforced in the Police Act and Regulations of 1990, Chapter 359, which classified the duties of the police to include prevention and detection of crime, apprehension of offenders, preservation of law and order, protection of life and property, enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged and the performance of such military duties within or without Nigeria as may be required of them by or under the authority of the Act or any other act.

Nigeria is currently grappling with a myriad of security challenges. The country has been plagued by a plethora of threats, including Boko Haram, herdsmen/farmers conflicts, kidnapping and banditry, ritual killings and cannibalism, cattle rustling, drug and human trafficking, militancy, illicit proliferation of small arms, and violent extremism. These security challenges have had far-reaching consequences, undermining the country’s stability, economic growth, and social cohesion (Ezinwa, 2019). For long, the country has, particularly, been battling with the insecurity issue posed by the activities of terrorist groups. Topping the list of these groups is the Boko Haram Sect (BHS) in the northeast of Nigeria. Terrorism is a global phenomenon in the atmosphere of criminality (Aiyesimoju, 2015) and has become a major threat to world peace and order (Abodunrin et al., 2021). The militant actions of Boko Haram have become one of the biggest security risks in Africa, particularly around the region surrounding Lake Chad (Oyewole, 2015). In Nigeria, the devious and nasty actions of this terrorist organisation cannot be disregarded because of the attacks the organisation has carried out, which have resulted in loss of life, destruction of property worth billions of Naira, serious infrastructure damage, and loss of investment, capital, and income, among other things (Abodunrin et al., 2021). Since 2009, the Boko Haram Sect (BHS) and other terrorist organisations’ operations have impeded sustainable development and made the nation hazardous for people to live in, conduct business in, and invest in (Isiaka et al., 2023). We also have the Fulani herders in the northeast, the Delta militants in the south-south, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and Eastern Security Network (ESN) in the southeast, the Amotekun agitators in the southwest and the newly emerged terror group, the Lukarawas, in northwestern Nigeria.

The International Terrorism and Security Research (ITSR) alludes to the fact that terrorism is not new and that even though the word has been used since the beginning of recorded history, it can be relatively hard to define. Terrorism, according to the ITSR, has been described variously as both a tactic and strategy, a crime and a holy duty, and a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable abomination. The United States Department of Defence (USDD) defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.” Within this definition, there are three key elements: violence, fear, and intimidation. Each element produces terror in its victims. The FBI defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” The U.S. Department of State (USDS) defines terrorism as “premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” Boko Haram and splinter groups such as JAMBS (presently known as ISWAP) are believed by analysts to be largely a product of widespread socioeconomic and religious insecurities, and their ideology resonates among certain communities because of both historical narratives and modern grievances (Audu & Zakimayu, 2021). It has become increasingly clear that national security agencies can no longer work alone in preventing future attacks. They must work in partnership with other public and private agencies, most importantly with local police.

‘Counter-terrorism’ means the measures undertaken by a government to defeat terrorism. It integrates and synchronises political, security, legal, economic, developmental and psychological activities to create a holistic approach that aims at weakening the terrorists while bolstering the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Several scholars clarified the meaning of counter-terrorism. For instance, Grey (2012) defined counter-terrorism as a set, or combinations, of diverse and multifaceted activities used in combating any terrorist violence in a given society. Campbell and Weitz (2005) also consider counter-terrorism to refer to all actions, activities, principles and tactics used by regular security groups in waging war against any terrorist group in a given political setting. To clarify it further, the United States Army (2006) defined counter-terrorism as military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by government to defeat terrorism. However, the focus of most counter-terrorism measures in this study is centred on the Nigeria Police Force. Police counter-terrorism refers to all forms of conventional combat adopted by the police force and other paramilitary and military forces in combating terrorism in a given political entity. It is a kinetic component of the counter-terrorism response to guerrilla warfare. According to Sampson (2015), the main principle of the counter-terrorism strategy is the application of aggressive force involving violent destruction of the enemy force and threatening of the local population to withdraw support for the terrorists. Therefore, counter-terrorism relies on operations that involve the use of aggression, such as detention of suspects, brutal elimination of individual terrorists, disruption of terrorists’ support networks, and decapitation of terrorist organisations. To contend with these terrorist activities in Nigeria, the federal government of Nigeria, irrespective of statutory restrictions, still deploys Nigeria police personnel to quell unwholesome loss of life and property from these theatres of terrorism in Nigeria.

Problem Statement

Nigeria is grappling with the pressing issue of terrorism, which has become a leading concern for national security. This menace has sparked intense discussions and varied comments in current national discourse (Aiyesimoju, 2015). Despite the Nigerian government’s best efforts, terrorist group activities have continued to grow throughout the northern area, with Boko Haram leading at the forefront, and they pose a severe threat to Nigeria and the region around Lake Chad (Sadau, 2015). Different approaches have been used by the Nigerian government to subdue and curtail the activities and operations of the numerous terrorist groups present in the country. Since terrorism continues to be a threat to Nigeria’s stability and peace, these measures, however, have not produced fruitful and beneficial results. The administration has largely focused on using the military strategy rather than alternative non-military ones to calm terrorism operations. Hence, there is the need to examine other non-military approaches, especially the criminal justice system, in the fight against terrorism. The urgent need to combat terrorism and the roles of critical stakeholders in the fight against terrorism have been investigated in literature. For instance, Aiyesimoju (2015) examined the role of the media in containing terrorism by outlining how the activities of the media can be used to aid as well as thwart the activities of terrorism groups in the country. Ike (2018) examined the need to re-conceptualise the role of law in countering terrorism in Nigeria and explained the rationale behind strengthening Nigeria’s criminal justice system. However, the emphasis in these studies is on the efficacy of the police operational duties in terms of countering terrorism. Against this background, this study aims to explore the forms of Nigeria Police participation in counter-terrorism operations, the effectiveness of Nigeria Police involvement in counter-terrorism operations and measures that could enhance police performance in counter-terrorism operations in the country.

 Theoretical Framework

Structural functionalism is a sociological theory that explains why society functions the way it does by emphasising the relationships between the various social institutions that make it up. The basic underpinnings of structural functionalism were built by French sociologist Émile Durkheim in the late nineteenth century, at least in part as a response to evolutionary theories of thinkers such as E. B. Tylor (Porth et al., 2015). Durkheim’s original goal was to explain social structures as a shared means for individuals in society to meet their own biological needs; he also wanted to explain the worth of cultural and social features in terms of their contribution to the general operation of society and life. Later, structural functionalism’s focus shifted to the manner in which social structures in society meet the social requirements of individuals inside that society. This theory was adopted as a theoretical framework for the study because of its strengths and strategic importance. The theory placed emphasis on the interdependency and interconnectedness of security formations, including the police force, and the necessity and urgency for them to form a synergy with the local civilian security formation in the host community for harmonious living. It was reported by Stearns (2013) that structural functionalism views society as functioning as an organism with the various social institutions working together as organs in the human body to maintain stability and integration. Radcliffe Brown espoused the interaction or interdependence of human activities in the social institutions that give rise to the cohesion, stability and peaceful coexistence of human society (Mediha, 2013; Palmer, 2013). Seeing the imperativeness of structural functionalism in understanding and explaining the police force as a subset of security organisations that contributes meaningfully to the existence and survival of the whole social system, the theory was found much more relevant to and apt in examining police involvement in community security, with emphasis on counter-terrorism.

Forms of Police Participation in Counter-terrorism Operations

One cannot overemphasise the duties and responsibilities of the police in any given society. The police are recognised members of the society charged with the responsibility of security of lives and property, maintaining law and order and prevention of all crimes, including terrorism. The roles the Nigeria police play are not just confined to the statutory description of their duties and responsibilities. Alongside other primary duties such as crime prevention and investigation, maintenance of law and order, and enforcement of all laws and regulations, the police also have a role to play in countering terrorism in Nigeria. This was confirmed from the above submission but is also partly stated in section 4 of the Police Act under “such military duties within or outside Nigeria as may be required by them by this or any other Act” (The Police Act, Cap [P19]). Nwauzi and Ogon (2018) also stated that the listed duties and powers of police officers are not exhaustive, as the duties and powers of police officers are expansive. The Nigeria Police discharge other specific secondary duties like highway traffic control and management, provision of assistance during disasters and the conduct of prosecution before any court in the country (Madubuike-Ekwe & Obayemi, 2019).

Detailed explanation of some forms of police participation in curbing the menace of terrorism in Nigeria. The forms in which the police manifest in its duty of counter-terrorism include but are not limited to the following: Involvement in intelligence gathering and sharing with other security agencies to buffer counter-terrorism operations; counselling people as well as relevant stakeholders in the country about the need for peace in the society. This is done in a bid to write off the wrong and poisonous orientation people might have received concerning situations in the country; mopping up arms and ammunitions, drugs and narcotic substances in the society; working in synergy with relevant stakeholders, bodies and national institution agencies such as the NDLEA, EFCC, NAFDAC and others; working with other security agencies such as the Nigerian Military, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) to enhance synergy towards countering terrorism; training and re-training of police personnel on recent crime fighting modes in order to effectively engage the terrorist groups; engaging the religious and community leaders in talks about peace and giving proper orientation to their members so as to proactively repel the desire to engage in terrorism;  striving to administer and dispense justice to improve people’s trust and confidence in the justice system so that aggression will not set-in on an aggrieved party thereby leading to terrorism.

Effectiveness of Nigeria Police Involvement in Counter-terrorism Operations

Challenges to the police role in counterterrorism have marred the effectiveness of police involvement in counterterrorism operations. Some challenges facing the police in their fight against terrorism are found as follows: First, there is insufficient training for the officers facing terrorists, and being sent to fight well-trained and equipped terrorists sounds like a suicide mission. Second, there is an allegation of misappropriation of funds allocated for counterterrorism operations. This leaves the police with insufficient funds and resources that, in turn, affects their efficiency and effectiveness in the fight against the terrorist. Third, political interference and corrupt practices among policymakers are also alleged. This kind of interference and corruption can always delay actions against the terrorist, thereby limiting the effectiveness, efficiency and productivity of the police. Fourth, command friction between the police and their military partners in the Joint Task Force. This fourth challenge is to be expected between military and paramilitary agencies whose ranking and protocols are similar but still unique. So the issue of superiors and subordinates in the face of command and order-controlled organisation can always be an issue, especially when there are no laid-down rules of operation and command protocols. Therefore, it becomes necessary to take further study into the rules of engagement of the Joint Task Force in order to find out the cause of this challenge and root it in the bud. The fifth challenge found is the existence of some moles (spies or traitors) in the joint military-police-civilian task force on counter-terrorism, which jeopardises the effectiveness of their operations. These findings support previous research reports (Bamidele, 2016; Nnam et al., 2020), which all agreed that concerted efforts to overcome the odious act of terrorism have been sabotaged and frustrated by some civilians in the host communities, politicians and security personnel, who provide corresponding assistance (such as leaking of security tactics and strategies, intelligence and information) to the terrorists (Nwakanma, 2022).

The effectiveness of the use of force approach adopted by the Nigeria Police counter-terrorism is pointed out, and the heavy-handed approach by Nigeria’s security sector against members of terrorist groups exacerbated sentiments of communal insecurity. In an extensive military operation, the Nigerian state destroyed the compound of the group and killed scores of terrorists. Disproportionate force and extrajudicial killings by the statutory security sector cause some terrorist groups to respond with revenge attacks against the institutions of the state. The lack of capacity and capability in Nigeria’s law enforcement and military, coupled with a failure to appreciate the importance of community engagement in counter-terrorism, set the state on a collision course with the group and its followers. Samson (2015) asserts that, while assessing the dilemma of counter-terrorism and human rights in Northern Nigeria, he argued that the aggressive approach of the SJTF perpetrated through gross violations of human rights undermined the support of the population. This assertion connotes that the excessive use of brutal force by the police force, alongside other security agencies, serves as a restraint to the effectiveness of police involvement in counter-terrorism operations.

Similarly, Kalid (2021), while being interviewed by the BBC, pointed out the ineffectiveness of using a force approach to terrorism, thus: the over-reliance on a military strategy to confront terrorist groups is at the heart of the state’s inability to deal with the threat. That is why, unfortunately, almost 11 or 12 years into the counter-terrorism operation, there seem to be no major successes recorded. The reality is that to address terrorism, you need more than a brutal force operation. You need to address the root causes of the terrorism emergence. Paradoxically, Sampson (2015) also claimed that since its engagement in the counterterrorism, the SJTF, including the police, has become anathema to the local communities in the Northeast. According to him, the indiscriminate use of force and other arbitrary acts have led to an unwarranted loss of life and destruction of valuable property, as well as constituted an extensive humanitarian crisis in the Northeast. He further maintained that, in addition to the direct offensive approach, the operation was reinforced by the adoption of draconian laws like the massive imposition of dusk-to-dawn curfews, restriction of vehicular movement, and bans on the use of communication lines. The overall effects of these measures thus undermined the support of the population for counter-terrorism. This indicates that there can never be a purely forceful solution to violent extremism. There is therefore a need to abandon the conventional force-centric approach as the one and only option for terrorism and other asymmetric conflicts. While not ignoring the importance of using a force approach, stability, political-economic-social development, rule of law, popular well-being, and sustainable peace all depend on effective and legitimate control of the national territory; the force-centric approach must be balanced with a population-centric approach for maximum effectiveness and legitimacy (Jerome, 2015).

Measures to Enhance Police Performance in Counter-terrorism Operations

Given the complexity of the security situation in Nigeria, blended with the economic, political, and social strife, projects and programs designed to counter terrorism should be built around community resilience, enhance cooperation among law enforcement agencies, and strengthen judicial institutions. Hence, strategy and the importance of collective efforts to counter terrorism in an increasingly interdependent and interconnected Nigeria have become imperative. Hence, some measures that could be used to counter terrorism in Nigeria were extensively examined.

Measures to enhance police performance in counter-terrorism target a different aspect of what Piombo (2007) calls the four “Ds” of fighting terrorism: ‘Defeat terrorists and their organisations; Deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists; Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, and Defend citizens and interests at home and abroad.’ Another way to consider these programmes’ effectiveness is that they should attempt to fight the supply of terrorists, the demand for terrorist networks, and the ability of terrorists to operate and manoeuvre. Counterterrorism measures are captured in the below headings.

1. The Meghalaya Model

The Meghalaya model is a multi-sector approach involving government, law enforcement, judiciary, and civil society organisations that created a comprehensive framework for combating trafficking in Northeast Asia in 1999 under the five “Ps”: prevention, protection, policing, press, and prosecution (Kharbhih, 2010). The Meghalaya Model is designed to track and rescue trafficked children in Northeast Asia; to facilitate rehabilitation; and to make sure that survivors do not get re-trafficked. It also provides families with livelihood alternatives, provides evidence to prosecute offenders, and raises awareness through the media. The process of the Meghalaya Model is the five “Rs”: reporting, rescue, rehabilitation, repatriation and re-education. It is believed that these activities that are pillars of the Meghalaya model to counter human trafficking are relevant to counter-terrorism, as they could fight the supply of terrorists, the supply of mercenaries for terrorism, and the demand for terrorist networks. This is imperative because, despite international agreements and a plethora of national laws on counter-terrorism, the issue remains one of the fastest-growing criminal violence in the world. Its proliferation is due to its cross-border nature and thus requires cooperation and collaboration between states if it is to be tackled effectively. However, throughout the world, often counterterrorism initiatives have failed to incorporate all relevant stakeholders. Hence, the Meghalaya Model, though originally designed to track and rescue trafficked children, could be adopted or adapted to counter terrorism in Nigeria, as there are insinuations of mercenaries and conscripted fighters for terrorists. And with the porous nature of Nigerian borders and the rate of human trafficking in the country, these mercenaries and conscripted fighters could be trafficked victims from neighbouring countries. This model is relevant to counter-terrorism in Nigeria because through a collaborative and far-reaching security network of stakeholders in counter-terrorism (security and intelligence agencies, NAPTIP, the media, civil society and NGOs), terrorists, mercenaries and terror suspects are more likely to be arrested and will face prosecution.

2. Countering Terrorism through Public-Private Partnerships (CTPPP)

While combating terrorism is a primary responsibility of nation states, developing partnerships with the private sector can be beneficial, especially in areas where state resources and expertise are limited. The public-private partnerships (PPPs) concept is gaining attention in the business world but at a much slower pace in the security domain. For instance, Jonathan Lucas, Director of the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), argues that progress to build partnerships on security matters has been hampered by a lack of legislation to facilitate information exchange between the public and private sectors, as well as the absence of incentives because ‘too often no incentives are provided to encourage the private sector to invest in the protection of vulnerable targets, as the private sector usually considers funding of PPP initiatives in security sectors as a cost rather than an investment’ (2012, p. 8). However, the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy explicitly encourages such partnerships in capacity-building and information exchange. Hence the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) working group on countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes argues how it benefited from private sector expertise in ‘the technical and legal aspects on how the Internet could be used to counter terrorist narratives’ (2012, p. 8). Russia, for example, has been engaging with Moscow State University and People’s Friendship University of Russia to exchange new ideas and expertise in countering terrorism. Because in their view, ‘private-public cooperation should not be limited to the business community alone but should also include non-governmental organisations, media, tourism and hotels, youth associations, the academic community and religious leaders’ involvement in the security sector’ (Yudintsev, 2012).

3. Empowering Youth as Peace-Entrepreneurs and Peace-Seeds

There is growing evidence from the social science literature on the links between youth unemployment and armed conflict, and donors have increasingly used programmes that create jobs for youth as a tool to address armed violence. Many donors now identify addressing youth unemployment as an urgent priority, both in the field of peace buildinpeacebuildingg and in efforts to foster economic development (World Bank, 2008; ILO, 2010; UN, 2009). Similarly, the link between job creation and peacebuilding has been affirmed by the UN Secretary General’s approval of the ‘UN Policy For Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation And Reintegration’ in 2008, as well as by the ILO’s 2010 Guidelines on Local Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict (UN, 2009; ILO, 2010). However, studies find that both the theoretical and empirical cases for using youth employment programmes as a ‘standalone’ tool to reduce violent conflict are extremely weak, because donor interventions have been poorly evaluated and evidence of success typically only demonstrates increases in employment levels, with little effort made to assess the impact on conflict. Hence, evidence on using job creation as part of an integrated or comprehensive armed conflict or Anti Violence Response (AVR) strategy is stronger: some government-led initiatives in countries that experience high levels of armed violence (such as Brazil and South Africa) are positive examples. So, the emphasis on the youth Anti Violence Response (AVR) strategy should be based on holistic, comprehensive, and integrated approaches that go beyond simply addressing a lack of economic opportunities and seek to tackle the more complex array of factors (such as belief systems, religious, political, and ethnic fundamentalism) that turn youth into entrepreneurs of violence rather than peace-seeds. This is imperative because Omale (2013) argues that, if youth involvement in terrorism is becoming a real threat, then the primary step is to try to understand the phenomena systems andphenomenonof increase, anphenomenonincrease andd the causes of such criminal deviance. Because in the word increase andwordsof Socrates,words, ‘Fundamentum Omnius Cultus animae’ (i.e.,, the soul of all improvement is the improvement of the soul). For instance, the goal of most national educational curricula in modern times is to produce professionals such as scientists, lawyers, doctors, and engineers for society. How much of our school curriculum includes active citizenship education, youth leadership skills, civil courtesies, and relationship-building communication?building? The earlier we begin to instilinstil the skills of ‘learning to live together’ and respect for humanity and society through active citizenship education, the better for our society.

4. Women-Gender Intelligence (WGI)

The innovation of “Women-Gender Intelligence” (WGI), particularly in the events of volatile conflict and endemic suicide bombings in Nigeria, has become imperative. For instance, with the continued violent conflict in Jos and the emerging suicide bombings in the country, the “Women for Change and Development Initiative” of the Office of the First Lady of Nigeria orchestrated media campaigns and jingles of “Women: See Something; Say Something!” and “The One that gives life must Protect Life!” The impact of these jingles and campaigns, this author would argue, motivated a rural woman in a village called Haya Biu, Niger State, to assist the State Security Service in Nigeria to unravel the hideout of some Boko Haram extremists on 6th September, 2011, who until then had been hiding there and making IEDs. By this revelation, it could be argued that women can be strong agents of change and development if adequately harnessed. In terms of security and counterterrorism in Nigeria, this paper argues that if women voluntarily and unanimously agree to stop insecurity, they can because there is no terrorist or criminal that does not have a mother, a spouse, or a girlfriend. The Women Gender Intelligence (WGI) is even more relevant in the Nigerian context since it is insinuated that some Boko Haram perpetrators are youth who cannot afford to pay a bride price for a wife and are so brainwashed and recruited to kill so as to be rewarded with seven virgins in Aljena. In this case, therefore, if women are granted protection as whistleblowers, they can be a good source of intelligence on counterterrorism in Nigeria.

5. Counter Extremism and De-radicalisation Programmes (CEDP)

Religion and cultural differences are among the most important causes of conflicts and violence in Nigeria. A very worrisome dimension of the role of religion in conflicts is the tendency and frequency with which some politicians and leaders exploit it for selfish reasons, as sometimes public statements on issues of religion tend to ignite or exacerbate conflicts, justifying the need for conflict sensitivity. Our world – as an American sociologist, Peter Berger, notes – is ‘fiercely religious’, and Nigeria has witnessed rising essentialism within all the major religions. For instance, a Muslim cleric was once criticised by the media for publicly preaching to his followers in a mosque in Kano (northern Nigeria) that “Un ka kama Mary ko Chinyere ka chisu” (meaning “if you catch a girl with a name Mary or Chinyere, rape her”). This is hate-based preaching that encourages young Muslim boys to rape girls bearing Christian or South Eastern names in Nigeria. In the same vein, some Neo-Pentecostal and evangelical Christians in Nigeria see themselves (the “born again” brethren) as holier than the ‘Other’. Similarly, crusades that dwell much more on the Biblical verse of Mathew 11:12, which states, “And from the days of John the Baptist until now, the kingdom of heaven suffered violence, and the violent takes it by force,” are becoming common citations among youth in Nigeria. Whereas, this Biblical injunction does not encourage violence, perverse interpretations of these religious injunctions, however, have crept into the minds of some people. This radical mindset has created many of the world’s violent outbreaks, both present and past. Lammy (2013) argues in an article written after the May 22nd killing of a Woolwich soldier by a terrorist suspect (Michael Adebolajo) that ‘radical Islamism suffocates conventional Islamic beliefs with a diet of anger, hate and intolerance among young men, who perhaps are already convinced of being outcasts and are intoxicated by teachings that not only entrench this difference further but also demand that they despise the society they leave behind.’ Hence, it is not uncommon for fringe groups of all ideological persuasions to systematically target these men by manipulating their sense of hopelessness and lack of belonging (Lammy, 2013). However, if religion could be used to cause conflict, it could be used to resolve conflict. Because even in this climate of global religious turbulence, religions offer the potential for generosity, wisdom and an ethical sense of transcendence capable of creating a strong link between people, beyond their differences. People might have different beliefs and dogmas and adhere to different schools of philosophical and metaphysical thought, but I strongly believe that it is possible to share a pragmatic universal system of ethics that would allow us all to live together. So Counter Extremism and De-radicalisation Programmes (CEDP) can work and could be an effective way of countering the spread of radical-violent ideology and activism, provided that the right conditions for success exist. These include, among others, political will, a vibrant civil society, and a robust developmental and political capacity within the Nigerian state.

 6. Security Inter-Operability (SIO)

 In every human society there are those that could not be safely contained in the community. Security interoperability that encourages security networking and intelligence sharing could root out the bad eggs in the society. For instance, if the police, SSS, EFCC and NIA work collaboratively, they could unravel the local and international sponsors and financiers of Boko Haram. Similarly, if the Customs, Immigration and the NDLEA work collaboratively, they could unravel the criminal importation of foreign mercenaries, drugs, arms and ammunition that are sustaining the Boko Haram insurgencies. In the same vein, the SSS and police working collaboratively with the Prisons Service could plant pseudo inmates who are fluent in Arabic, Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri in strategic prison cells for intelligence gatherings from detained Boko Haram suspects. The Military Joint Task Forces (JMTF) could as well invest in telemetric security and cable detection technology and use fewer roadblocks. Where these security strategies are done well, the use of the Military Joint Task Forces (MJTF) fire operations would only be the last resort. But if terror attacks do occur, a coordinated and well-equipped MJTF that comprises the military forces, NEMA, the fire service and the Red Cross should be on standby for effective evacuation and other needed humanitarian and relief services. However, in a system like Nigeria where security and law enforcement agencies struggle for supremacy and lay claim to arrests and security breakthroughs (as was the case in Kabiru Sokoto’s arrest), interoperability becomes difficult to achieve. Nigeria does not lack the institutions to counter terrorism, but what Nigerian security and law enforcement agencies need to understand is that “success for one is success for all”. ”.

7. Community Policing Approach

In community policing, the community should be the primary objective for the police: its tacit support, its submission to law and order, its consensus, etc. It is therefore necessary to obtain the support of the community not only in the form of sympathy and approval but also in active participation in keeping the society safe. The police must build confidence in the community by conducting themselves professionally and showing the ability to hold volunteered information in the highest secrecy and protect those they have been entrusted to protect at all costs. In community policing, law enforcement agencies share power with residents of a community, and critical decisions need to be made at the neighbourhood level. Establishing and maintaining mutual trust between citizens of a community and the police is the main goal of the first component of community policing. In full partnership, law enforcement agencies and a community’s residents and business owners are supposed to identify core problems, propose solutions, and implement a solution. For this problem-solving process to operate effectively, the police need to devote time and attention to discovering the community’s concerns, and they need to recognise the validity of those concerns. If the police treat suspected terrorists/insurgents using methods and practices outside the law, such as collective punishment or arbitrary detention, this itself undermines the legitimacy of government and can create new grievances, inhibiting the effectiveness of counter-terror or counter-insurgency policies. However, in the real sense and in reality, the counter-terrorism in Nigeria is dominated by security operations (Audu & Zakimayu, 2021).

Conclusion and Recommendations

Young men almost exclusively lead and execute terrorist attacks globally. Nigeria, with its abundant unemployed labour force, exploitative politicians, radical clerics, a population prone to violence, and weakened national and community cohesion, provides a competitive advantage for militant and terrorist organisations, criminal networks, and corrupt political leaders. International experience in countering terrorism has shown that the key to preventing violence against the state and its citizens is policing that establishes government legitimacy and wins public support. In societies where endemic violence poses a threat, we should entrust the responsibility for security to police deployed among the population. Police are the public face of the government. By performing their duties in a professional manner, police build support for the government they represent. Acts committed by terrorists are crimes, which are the responsibility of the police and the criminal justice system. Killing or capturing terrorists when they are engaged in terrorist acts is not an effective solution to insecurity. The solution is to identify would-be terrorists before they commit acts of violence using information provided by citizens to the police. To make this approach work effectively, the police must recognise the importance of collaborating with citizens. The police must also adopt a citizen-oriented approach to policing. Police establish effective relations with the public by being available and easily accessible, by being responsive and acting promptly to requests for assistance from individuals, and by being fair and impartial, treating everyone professionally, respectfully, and empathetically. This approach is based on relationships, attitudes, and values. It requires neither advanced technical skills nor heavy weaponry.

                                                            Recommendations

1. The police should be provided with sophisticated equipment, discipline and training (the curricula in police training institutions must reflect present-day challenges, e.g., detailed courses on terrorism/military history, policing, forensics, etc.).

2. It is imperative that police officers undergo regular specialised training and retraining prior to deployment. This will equip them against the well-trained and equipped terrorists.

3. The funding and deployment of police officers for the counterterrorism operations should be depoliticised. The influence of the politicians on the processes of operation of the counterterrorism is affecting the smooth operation of the units if the funds set apart for their operation are misappropriated.

4. There should be a very strict and unbiased screening of the officers deployed into the counterterrorism units. This screening should be done by external bodies outside the government and its agencies. This will help rid the ranks and files of the moles that jeopardise their operations.

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Subaltern Voices and the Politics of Representation in Postcolonial Texts

Daily writing prompt
Where would you go on a shopping spree?

Citation

Dwivedi, S. (2026). Subaltern Voices and the Politics of Representation in Postcolonial Texts. International Journal of Research, 13(2), 218–224. https://doi.org/10.26643/rb.v118i1.7619

Shambhavi Dwivedi

MA, NET (English)

Dwivedi Clinic

Bhagwan Bazar, Chapra

Abstract

Postcolonial literature has played a crucial role in foregrounding the voices of marginalized communities whose experiences were historically excluded from dominant colonial narratives. One of the most significant concepts within postcolonial studies is the notion of the subaltern, which refers to those social groups that remain outside the structures of power and representation within hegemonic discourse. Colonial regimes not only imposed political and economic domination but also controlled systems of knowledge and cultural representation, thereby silencing indigenous voices and rewriting histories from the perspective of imperial authority. In response to these distortions, postcolonial writers and theorists have sought to recover the experiences of the subaltern and challenge the politics of representation embedded within colonial discourse. This research article examines the emergence of subaltern voices in postcolonial texts and analyzes how literature becomes a space for contesting hegemonic power structures. It explores the theoretical framework of subaltern studies and the politics of representation articulated by major thinkers, while also investigating the narrative strategies employed by postcolonial writers to represent marginalized communities. The study further examines how issues of voice, agency, identity, gender, and cultural memory shape the representation of subaltern experiences in postcolonial narratives. By analyzing selected literary works from postcolonial contexts, the article demonstrates that literature functions not only as a medium of artistic expression but also as a site of political resistance and cultural recovery. Ultimately, the politics of representation in postcolonial texts reveals the complexities involved in giving voice to historically marginalized groups and underscores the importance of literature in challenging structures of domination and reconstructing alternative histories.

Keywords: Subaltern studies, postcolonial literature, politics of representation, marginalization, identity, resistance, cultural memory

Introduction

The emergence of postcolonial literature marked a significant shift in the way history, culture, and identity were represented in literary discourse. For centuries, colonial powers dominated not only the political and economic structures of colonized societies but also their cultural and intellectual narratives. Colonial literature and historiography frequently portrayed colonized peoples as passive subjects, incapable of self-representation and dependent upon the civilizing influence of European authority. These representations served to legitimize imperial power while simultaneously marginalizing indigenous voices and cultural traditions.

In response to this legacy, postcolonial writers began to challenge the dominant narratives of empire by foregrounding the experiences of marginalized communities. One of the central concerns of postcolonial studies is the recovery of subaltern voices—those individuals and groups who have historically been excluded from positions of power and whose perspectives have rarely been recorded in official historical accounts. The concept of the subaltern has become a crucial analytical tool in examining how colonial power structures operated and how marginalized groups resisted and negotiated these structures.

The term “subaltern” originally emerged within Marxist discourse to describe the lower classes who were excluded from political representation. However, within postcolonial studies, the term has acquired broader significance, referring to those populations whose voices are suppressed within dominant systems of knowledge and representation. Subaltern groups often include peasants, tribal communities, laborers, women, and other marginalized populations who remain outside elite political and cultural institutions.

Postcolonial literature has played an important role in bringing subaltern experiences into global visibility. Writers from formerly colonized societies have sought to challenge the hierarchical structures of representation that colonialism established. By narrating the experiences of marginalized communities, these authors question the authority of colonial historiography and create alternative narratives that highlight the struggles and resilience of oppressed groups.

The politics of representation is central to this process. Representation involves more than simply describing social realities; it also involves the power to shape how those realities are understood. In colonial discourse, representation was often controlled by imperial institutions that depicted colonized peoples in stereotypical and dehumanizing ways. Postcolonial writers confront these representations by offering new perspectives that emphasize the agency, dignity, and complexity of marginalized communities.

This research article explores the ways in which postcolonial texts engage with the politics of representation and recover subaltern voices. It examines the theoretical foundations of subaltern studies and analyzes the narrative strategies through which postcolonial writers represent marginalized experiences. Through this exploration, the article demonstrates that literature serves as a powerful tool for challenging dominant narratives and reconstructing cultural identity.

Theoretical Foundations of Subaltern Studies

The emergence of subaltern studies in the late twentieth century significantly transformed the field of postcolonial scholarship. The Subaltern Studies collective, a group of historians and scholars primarily working on South Asian history, sought to challenge traditional historiography that focused primarily on elite political leaders and colonial administrators. These scholars argued that conventional historical narratives failed to account for the experiences and contributions of ordinary people, particularly peasants and marginalized communities.

Subaltern studies emphasized the importance of examining history from the perspective of those who had been excluded from dominant narratives. By focusing on grassroots movements, local resistance, and everyday forms of agency, scholars sought to reconstruct a more inclusive understanding of historical processes. This approach challenged the assumption that historical change was driven solely by elite actors and highlighted the role of marginalized groups in shaping political and social transformations.

One of the most influential contributions to subaltern theory came from scholars who examined the relationship between power and representation. They argued that colonial knowledge systems played a crucial role in shaping how colonized societies were understood. Through institutions such as education, administration, and scholarship, colonial powers produced narratives that reinforced their authority and marginalized indigenous perspectives.

Subaltern studies also raised important questions about the possibility of representing marginalized voices. Some scholars argued that the subaltern cannot easily speak within dominant systems of representation because those systems are structured by power relations that exclude them. This perspective highlights the difficulties involved in recovering subaltern voices and underscores the need for new methodological approaches in both historical and literary analysis.

Postcolonial literature provides one such approach by creating imaginative spaces in which marginalized voices can be articulated. Through storytelling, writers are able to reconstruct the experiences of those who were excluded from official historical records. While literature cannot fully replicate the lived experiences of subaltern communities, it can offer powerful insights into the social and cultural dynamics that shape their lives.

Colonial Discourse and the Politics of Representation

Colonial discourse played a crucial role in shaping the representation of colonized societies. Through literature, anthropology, and administrative reports, colonial authorities constructed images of indigenous populations that emphasized their supposed inferiority and backwardness. These representations served to justify colonial rule by portraying imperial powers as benevolent agents of progress and civilization.

The politics of representation refers to the ways in which power influences how individuals and communities are depicted in cultural narratives. In colonial discourse, representation was closely linked to the maintenance of imperial authority. By controlling the production of knowledge about colonized societies, colonial institutions were able to shape global perceptions of these communities.

These representations often relied on stereotypes that reduced complex cultures to simplistic and negative images. Colonized peoples were frequently depicted as irrational, primitive, or incapable of self-governance. Such portrayals reinforced the ideological foundations of colonialism and contributed to the marginalization of indigenous voices.

Postcolonial writers challenge these representations by exposing their ideological assumptions and presenting alternative perspectives. Through literature, they reveal the contradictions and injustices embedded within colonial discourse. By highlighting the humanity and agency of marginalized communities, postcolonial narratives challenge the stereotypes that colonialism perpetuated.

The politics of representation also involves questions about who has the authority to speak for others. In many cases, the representation of marginalized communities has been controlled by elite institutions or individuals who do not share the experiences of those they depict. Postcolonial literature addresses this issue by emphasizing the importance of self-representation and by creating narrative spaces in which marginalized voices can be heard.

Subaltern Voices in Postcolonial Literature

One of the most significant contributions of postcolonial literature is its focus on the experiences of marginalized communities. Writers from diverse cultural backgrounds have used literature to explore the lives of those who were historically excluded from positions of power and representation. These narratives often highlight the struggles faced by subaltern groups while also emphasizing their resilience and capacity for resistance.

Subaltern voices in literature frequently emerge through characters who occupy marginalized social positions. These characters may belong to oppressed castes, tribal communities, rural populations, or other groups that have historically been excluded from dominant narratives. By centering these perspectives, postcolonial writers challenge traditional literary hierarchies and expand the scope of storytelling.

The representation of subaltern experiences also involves exploring the everyday realities of marginalization. Issues such as poverty, displacement, cultural erosion, and social discrimination often feature prominently in postcolonial narratives. Through these depictions, writers reveal the structural inequalities that shape the lives of marginalized communities.

At the same time, postcolonial literature does not simply portray subaltern groups as passive victims of oppression. Many texts emphasize the agency and resistance of marginalized individuals who challenge the systems of power that seek to control them. This emphasis on resistance highlights the dynamic nature of subaltern identity and underscores the importance of recognizing the contributions of marginalized communities to social and political change.

Gender, Subalternity, and Representation

Gender plays a crucial role in shaping the experiences of subaltern communities. Women in colonized societies often faced multiple layers of marginalization, including colonial domination, patriarchal oppression, and economic exploitation. As a result, the representation of subaltern women presents unique challenges within postcolonial literature.

Many postcolonial writers have sought to explore the intersections between gender and subalternity. These narratives often highlight the ways in which colonial and patriarchal structures interact to shape the lives of women. Issues such as domestic violence, social exclusion, and cultural restrictions frequently appear in these texts.

At the same time, postcolonial literature also portrays women as active participants in resistance movements and cultural transformation. Female characters often challenge traditional gender roles and assert their autonomy in various ways. Through these representations, postcolonial writers emphasize the importance of recognizing women’s contributions to social and political struggles.

The representation of subaltern women also raises important questions about voice and agency. Some critics argue that literary representations of marginalized women must be approached with caution to avoid reproducing stereotypes or speaking on behalf of those whose experiences may differ from those of the author. This challenge underscores the complexity of representing subaltern identities within literary discourse.

Narrative Strategies in Representing the Subaltern

Postcolonial writers employ a variety of narrative techniques to represent subaltern voices and challenge dominant discourses. One common strategy is the use of multiple narrative perspectives. By presenting events from different viewpoints, authors create a more nuanced understanding of social realities and highlight the diversity of experiences within marginalized communities.

Another important technique is the incorporation of oral traditions and folklore. Many postcolonial societies possess rich oral storytelling traditions that were marginalized by colonial institutions. By integrating these traditions into written literature, authors create alternative narrative forms that reflect indigenous cultural practices.

Language also plays a crucial role in representing subaltern voices. Postcolonial writers often experiment with linguistic forms by blending colonial languages with local dialects and expressions. This linguistic hybridity challenges the dominance of standard literary language and allows writers to capture the rhythms and nuances of everyday speech.

Fragmented narrative structures are also common in postcolonial texts. These structures reflect the disruptions caused by colonialism and highlight the complexities of historical memory. Rather than presenting a linear narrative, fragmented storytelling emphasizes the multiplicity of voices and perspectives that shape collective experience.

Through these narrative strategies, postcolonial literature creates spaces for marginalized voices to emerge. These techniques not only challenge traditional literary conventions but also contribute to the broader project of decolonizing knowledge and representation.

Cultural Memory and the Reconstruction of Identity

Cultural memory plays a significant role in the representation of subaltern voices within postcolonial literature. Colonial rule often disrupted traditional forms of memory by imposing new systems of education and cultural values. As a result, many communities experienced a loss of historical continuity and cultural identity.

Postcolonial writers seek to reconstruct these memories by revisiting historical events and cultural traditions that were marginalized under colonial rule. Through storytelling, they recover the experiences of past generations and reconnect contemporary readers with their cultural heritage.

The reconstruction of cultural memory also contributes to the formation of new identities in postcolonial societies. By reclaiming suppressed histories, individuals and communities are able to redefine their relationship with the past and assert their cultural autonomy.

This process often involves negotiating the complex interactions between indigenous traditions and colonial influences. Postcolonial identities are rarely defined by a single cultural heritage; instead, they emerge from the dynamic interplay of multiple historical and cultural forces. Literature provides a space for exploring these complexities and for imagining new possibilities for cultural belonging.

Conclusion

The recovery of subaltern voices represents one of the most significant achievements of postcolonial literature. By challenging the politics of representation embedded within colonial discourse, postcolonial writers have created new narrative spaces in which marginalized communities can be heard. These narratives expose the limitations of traditional historiography and emphasize the importance of recognizing diverse perspectives in the construction of historical knowledge.

The politics of representation remains a complex and contested issue within postcolonial studies. While literature offers powerful tools for recovering suppressed voices, it also raises important questions about authorship, authority, and the ethics of representation. Nevertheless, postcolonial texts demonstrate that storytelling can serve as a form of resistance against structures of domination.

Through their exploration of subaltern experiences, postcolonial writers contribute to the broader project of decolonizing knowledge and reconstructing cultural identity. Their works remind readers that history is not a neutral record of events but a dynamic process shaped by power, memory, and interpretation.

Ultimately, the representation of subaltern voices in postcolonial literature underscores the transformative potential of narrative. By giving voice to those who have been historically silenced, literature becomes a site of cultural recovery, political critique, and social empowerment.

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Indian Women’s Historical Role in 21st Century

Daily writing prompt
Share one of the best gifts you’ve ever received.

Prof. Dr. Yogesh Jagannath Korde (Associate Professor, Dept.of History)

Uttamrao Patil Arts and Science College, Dahiwel, Tal. Sakri, Dist. Dhule.

Email: kordeyj10@gmail.com Mob. 7588735543 / 9423906366

Introduction:

In Indian culture, women have been considered symbols of respect, honor, and maternal power. From the Vedic period to the modern era, women have been given an important place in the formation of family, society, and culture. However, looking at the actual socio-political reality, women have often been given a secondary position. Although women are respected in the religious and cultural spheres, their participation in the social, economic, and especially political spheres has remained limited, which is a significant contradiction facing Indian democracy.

The contribution of women to the Indian freedom struggle is invaluable and inspiring. Many women like Rani Lakshmibai of Jhansi, Kasturba Gandhi, Sarojini Naidu, Annie Besant, and Vijayalakshmi Pandit actively participated in the freedom movement. They not only participated in movements and satyagrahas but also played a crucial role in the dissemination of national ideology, organization building, and leadership. However, in the post-independence period, especially in parliamentary politics, the representation of women has not increased as expected. A review of Indian politics over the approximately seven decades since independence shows that political power and decision-making processes are still primarily male-dominated. With a few notable exceptions, most women leaders in politics are connected to a family political background. Many women have risen to prominence due to the political legacy of their fathers, husbands, or other influential male leaders in their families. This raises questions about the independent leadership capabilities of women.

 Although reservations have been provided for women in local self-governing bodies, in practice, concepts like ‘Sarpanch’s husband’ and ‘Councillor’s husband’ are prevalent in many places. This makes women’s political participation merely formal, and men continue to dominate the actual decision-making process. This situation is alarming from the perspective of gender equality in Indian democracy. Men and women are considered two equal wheels of the chariot of society. To achieve the all-round development of the nation, it is essential to provide equal opportunities, equal rights, and equal responsibilities to both these components. However, even today, women do not receive political representation proportionate to their population. Therefore, the subject of ‘women and politics’ becomes a crucial research topic, not only socially but also politically, constitutionally, and in relation to democratic values. Against this backdrop, this research attempts to study the position, participation, contribution, and current status of women in Indian politics. The main objective of this study is to underscore the importance of women’s political participation in making Indian democracy more inclusive, egalitarian, and robust.

Research Goal:

The main objective of this research is to conduct an in-depth and critical study of the status, participation, leadership opportunities, and role of women in the decision-making process within Indian politics.  By analyzing the contributions of Indian women to the political field since independence, the opportunities they have received, and the patriarchal mindset that still exists, this research aims to clarify the current state of women’s political empowerment.

Research Objectives:

1) To review the historical contributions of women in Indian politics and analyze their participation from the freedom movement to the present day.

2) To study the representation of women in Parliament, state legislatures, the cabinet, and top constitutional positions (President, Prime Minister, Chief Minister, etc.).

3) To examine the influence of family political legacy and patriarchal power structures on women’s entry into and progress in politics.

4) To review the work and leadership qualities of prominent women political leaders in Maharashtra and India.

Research Methodology:

Historical Method: The historical method has been used to trace the journey, contributions, and changing roles of women in Indian politics from the pre-independence era to the present day.

Data Collection Tools:

For this research, data has been collected based on primary and secondary sources. Primary sources: Constitutional provisions, parliamentary proceedings, and government reports. Secondary sources: Books on political science and sociology, research papers, journals and magazines, newspapers, articles, and reliable websites.

Importance of the Subject:

Equal participation of men and women is crucial for the robustness of the Indian democratic system.  Despite women constituting nearly half of the Indian population, their participation in the political decision-making process is disproportionately low. Therefore, the subject of “Women and Politics” is not merely limited to academic study but is of paramount importance from the perspective of social, political, and democratic values. Men and women are the two inseparable wheels of the chariot of society, and if one wheel is neglected, the nation’s journey becomes unbalanced. Increased active participation of women in politics can lead to greater sensitivity in policy-making, giving more priority to social justice, education, health, women and child welfare, environment, and grassroots issues. This helps in making democracy more inclusive, representative, and effective.  The contributions of women in the freedom struggle, as well as the leadership demonstrated by women like Indira Gandhi, Pratibha Patil, Jayalalithaa, Mamata Banerjee, and Mayawati in high positions after independence, clearly show that women’s capabilities are in no way inferior to those of men. Yet, the fact that women are still given a secondary role in Indian politics is a matter of concern. Studying this inconsistency and investigating the underlying social, cultural, and political reasons is essential. Although the reservation system in local self-governing bodies has increased women’s participation, in many places, the indirect dominance of men in actual power is still evident. Therefore, this research underscores the need for not just quantitative representation, but also meaningful and independent political empowerment of women. The main objective of this research is to present the current situation of women in Indian politics from a realistic perspective, to highlight the inequalities based on data, and to stimulate positive policy discussions for increasing women’s political participation in the future.  Therefore, this research proves useful in creating social awareness and encouraging policymakers, scholars, and political parties to introspect.

Overall, women’s participation in politics is not merely a matter of women’s rights, but a fundamental basis for the quality of democracy, national progress, and social balance. Hence, the topic of women and politics is of paramount importance and remains highly relevant and necessary in the context of contemporary Indian society.

Despite women’s valuable contributions at the political, social, and national levels from the freedom movement to modern times, their participation in decision-making processes appears to be limited. The reality that women’s representation is extremely low at all levels of the highest positions in Indian democracy—President, Prime Minister, Vice President, Deputy Prime Minister, Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Chief Minister—cannot be denied. With a few notable exceptions, it is observed that the majority of women leaders have emerged based on their family’s political background. This highlights the patriarchal mindset and structural obstacles in Indian politics.

Although reservations have been provided for women in local self-governing bodies, in reality, women’s representation remains formal in many places, and their independent participation in decision-making is limited. Social customs, lack of education, economic dependence, and lack of political training are important reasons behind this.

However, women leaders like Indira Gandhi, Pratibha Patil, Jayalalithaa, Mamata Banerjee, Mayawati, Nirmala Sitharaman, and Sushma Swaraj have proven through their efficiency, leadership qualities, and decisive roles that Indian women can capably handle the highest responsibilities. Their work has helped dispel misconceptions about women’s leadership abilities. Overall, this research clearly shows that despite women’s undeniable contribution to Indian politics, they do not receive representation proportionate to their population. If we want to improve the quality of democracy and achieve the all-round development of the nation, it is essential to give women equal participation in the decision-making process, rather than limiting them merely to reservations. Providing women with political education, leadership training, and independent opportunities will make Indian politics more balanced, sensitive, and inclusive. Therefore, considering women and men as two equal wheels of the chariot of society, implementing concrete policy measures for the political empowerment of women is the need of the hour. Only then will it be possible to build a truly egalitarian and robust democracy.

References:

1) Diwan, Mohan; Devdhar, Jayant; Diwani, Vivek (2004), Politics of States in India.

Nagpur: Vidya Prakashan,

2) Government of Maharashtra (2017), Maharashtra Yearbook. Produced by Directorate General of Information and Public Relations, Mumbai–32,

3) Palshikar, Suhas; Birmal, Nitin, Politics of Maharashtra: Local Context. Pune: Pratima Prakashan,

4) Shinde, Sahadev; Chogule, Sahadev Patheya (Part–3). Kolhapur: Diksha Publication,

5) Mehendale, Vishwas, Yashwantrao Chavan to Prithviraj Chavan. Anubandh Prakashan,

6) Patil, Amritrao, Khandesh Lok Sabha. Jalgaon: Prashant Publication,

7) Women and Political Issues Jaipur: ABD Publication,

Analytical Study of Taxpayers towards Faceless Assessment under the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Its Evolution in the New Income Tax Act, 2025

Daily writing prompt
If there were a biography about you, what would the title be?

Nitin Manakchand Zawar and Dr. Rahul Anant Kulkarni

Nakshatra, Housing Society, B. P. Arts, S.M.A Science, K. K. C.  Shahu Nagar, Commerce College, Chalisgaon

Email: nitinmzawar@rediffmail.com

Abstract

Faceless assessment represents a watershed shift in Indian tax administration — from traditional, physical, and often discretionary tax officer interactions to a digitized, transparent, and process-driven system. Initiated under the Income-tax Act, 1961, this reform has sought to eliminate geographical jurisdiction, reduce taxpayer harassment, and infuse accountability into the tax assessment process. With the Government of India introducing the Income Tax Act, 2025 to replace the nearly six-decade-old 1961 Act from 1 April 2026, significant structural and procedural changes have been proposed in the assessment regime, including refinements to faceless assessments.

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the Faceless Assessment Scheme, tracing its legislative evolution, institutional architecture, procedural mechanics, and technological backbone. It examines the scheme’s legal foundation under Section 144B of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and its proposed continuation under Section 273 of the incoming Income Tax Act, 2025. Drawing on judicial pronouncements, academic insights, and stakeholder feedback, the article critically evaluates the operational challenges such as procedural delays, over-engineering of units, and the dilution of natural justice that threaten to undermine the scheme’s original vision.

Further This article highlights the transformative potential of faceless assessment in improving efficiency, and fostering taxpayer trust. It concludes with actionable policy recommendations advocating for structural simplification specifically, the abolition of redundant Technical and Review Units to restore accountability, improve assessment quality, and ensure that the faceless regime fulfils its promise of a fair, efficient, and justice-oriented tax administration.

Keywords: Faceless Assessment, Income Tax Act 1961 (Section 144B), Income Tax Act 2025, Section 273, Section 532, NeAC, Tax Transparency, Digital Governance, CBDT, Tax Reform, Finance Budget.

  1. Introduction: Tax Law and Administrative Reform in India

India’s taxation system has evolved over decades, anchored for the last sixty years in the Income-tax Act, 1961. Despite periodic amendments aimed at modernizing the system, the legacy Act accumulated complex language, procedural inefficiencies, and litigation challenges. Recognizing the need for a revamped statutory framework, the legislature introduced the Income Tax Bill, 2025, designed to replace the older law with a streamlined, modern, and digitally oriented statute. Among its key reforms is the embrace and enhancement of the faceless tax regime, a flagship reform initiated under the 1961 Act but carried forward and embedded within the 2025 Act’s procedural architecture.Faceless assessment seeks to augment transparency, reduce human discretion, and leverage technology for efficient tax administration. This article analyses the current law’s faceless assessment regime and juxtaposes it with the approach under the new statutory framework.

  • Background: The Concept of Faceless Assessment

Stakeholders widely agreed that India’s income tax system was once crippled by a rigid, location-based structure, which bred chronic inefficiency, a profound lack of transparency and entrenched unfair practices. The reliance on face-to-face dealings between taxpayers and tax officers often gave rise to prolonged delays and subjective bias.In the annual conclave of Tax Administration Authorities, “RajaswaGyanSangam”, held in June 2016, Honourable Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi Ji advocated tax administration reforms through the ‘RAPID’ approach standing for Revenue, Accountability, Probity, Information, and digitization. To transform age-old manual assessment methods, enhance transparency, efficiency, and accountability, and curb malpracticesthe E-Assessment Scheme 2019 was launched on 7 October 2019. The Finance Ministry launched the “Transparent Taxation – Honouring the Honest” platform on August 13, 2020, to ease taxpayers’ burdens and rebuild their trust in India’s tax system. This initiative rests on three key pillars: Faceless Assessment, Faceless Appeal, and the Taxpayers’ Charter. The heart of this reform lies the Faceless Assessment Scheme (FAS). It replaces from a system where tax assessments were conducted by a known officer in a known jurisdiction to one where both the assessing authority and the taxpayer remain anonymous throughout the process. The scheme was conceived not merely as a procedural upgrade but as a cultural and institutional transformation that rebuilds trust between the government and honest taxpayers

  • What is Faceless Assessment Scheme (FAS)?

Faceless assessment marks a significant evolution in India’s income tax administration, where the complete evaluation of a taxpayer’s income tax return occurs electronically, without any physical interaction or personal interface between the assessee and tax officials. Launched via the Faceless Assessment Scheme (FAS) in 2020 and integrated into the Income Tax Act, 1961 (as amended), this system aims to minimize discretionary authority of assessing officers, remove territorial jurisdiction limitations, and prevent instances of harassment or undue interference.

The process powered by the use of sophisticated advanced digital platforms, primarily the Income Tax e-filing portal (incometax.gov.in), which facilitates seamless operations. These include automated generation and issuance of notices under sections such as 143(2) or 142(1), secure online uploading of documents and responses by taxpayers, prompt handling of queries or show-cause notices, and electronic delivery of final assessment orders. Officers, based at faceless National e-Assessment Centres (NeACs) and Regional Faceless Centres (RfCs), are assigned cases randomly through algorithmic selection to uphold uniformity and objectivity. This shifts their role from traditional territorial adjudicators to streamlined, technology-enabled processors emphasizing data analysis and regulatory adherence.The rationale and Objectives for faceless assessment Scheme includesAll digital interactions are logged and traceable, reducing scope for arbitrary actions.Centralized processing and AI-assisted case allocation expedite handling which may reduce jurisdictional Bias and enhanced taxpayers experience.

  • Faceless Assessment under the Income-tax Act, 1961:
  1. Statutory Legal Basis: Under the Income-tax Act, 1961, faceless assessment was introduced through Section 144B, empowering the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) to define the faceless assessment process and procedures. The Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) operationalized the scheme through Notification No. 60/2020 dated 13th August 2020, which laid down the procedural and structural framework for faceless assessments. This notification along with subsequent amendments, established the institutional architecture, communication protocols, and operational guidelines. The provision mandated digital issuance of notices and electronic submissions of responses, including through video conferencing when needed. The key components in Faceless Assessment scheme includes:
  2. Electronic Notices: Initiation of assessment by the officers should be by issuing digitally served notices.
  3. Digital Responses: Taxpayers must furnish responses and documents through the Income Tax e-filing portal.
  4. Random Allocation: The system automatically allocates assessment cases to assessing officers outside territorial jurisdictions except the cases of Search and survey.
  5. Video Conferencing:Wherever Taxpayers feel that he wishes to explain the things orally as it is difficult to explain on paper he may seek personal hearings online through video conferencing if necessary. In this process also identity of the officer is not disclosed.
  6. Audit Trail: Comprehensive logging ensures accountability and traceability.
  1. Operational Workflow

The faceless assessment workflow under the 1961 Act generally involved:

  • Notice Issuance: The e-filing system issues assessment notices (e.g., under Sections 142(1), 143(2), or 148 etc.).
  • Document Submission:After receipt of the notice taxpayers upload his submission along with supporting documents and respond to queries online.
  • Assessment Draft order:Assessing officer prepare draft assessment order based on various submission made by the taxpayers and data collected by him by issuing notice U/s. 133(6) of the Income Tax Act 1961.
  • Submission against Draft order: Taxpayers can either object the draft order or accept the order after verification of the draft order.
  • Video Conferencing: Assessee can opt for the Video conferencing for argue the case orally.
  • Revised or Final order: After verification of submission to draft order Assessing officer prepare final order and send it for approval. 
  • Quality Review: Independent review panels ensure quality and fairness of the order.
  • Final Assessment Order:After all this process the final Assessment order is issued electronically in compliance with statutory timelines.
  • Limitations and Challenges of the 1961 Faceless Assessment Scheme:

While faceless assessment marked a significant improvement, several limitations under the 1961 Act emerged. Major limitations are:

  • Technological Adaptation: Older provisions were adapted to digital procedures but not inherently drafted for modern technology.
  • Procedural Complexity: Notices and responses under the 1961 Act require interpretation of multiple sections and cross references which could complicate digital automation.
  • Limitation of Space and size for document upload: The submission and relevant document uploaded through income tax portal is having limited space. At a time only 10 attachments can be upload and single attachment should not be more than 5 MB in size. It creates difficulty to taxpayers while submitting the submission.
  • Limited Scope for Clarification: Some taxpayers faced delays when seeking online hearings or clarifications.
  • Litigation Bottlenecks: Despite digital procedures, disputes continued due to ambiguities in language and procedural overlaps.

These concerns set the stage for a reimagined legislative approach under the Income Tax Act, 2025, which aims to build a more coherent digital assessment framework.

  • Overview of the Income Tax Act, 2025

The Income Tax Act, 2025 represents a comprehensive overhaul, replacing the fragmented 1961 law. It aims to achieve simplicity, efficiency, and taxpayer clarity. Key features include:

  • Reduced Length and Complexity: Sections are reduced from over 800 in the 1961 Act to 536, and the overall legislative language is simplified.
  • Unified Tax Year Concept: The traditional previous year and assessment year are eliminated, replaced by a single tax year concept.
  • Digitization Emphasis: Enhanced digital compliance tools, including faceless assessments and digital notice systems.

Importantly, the new Act will come into force on 1 April 2026, with new Income Tax Return (ITR) forms and rules notified prior to implementation. New Income tax rules are yet to be notified.

  • Faceless Assessment under the Income Tax Act, 2025:
  • Codification and Redrafting:Under the Income Tax Act 2025, provisions related to faceless assessment have been redrafted and consolidated to align with the overall objectives of clarity and digital orientation:
  • Consolidation: The old Section 144B of the 1961 Act, which detailed faceless assessment procedures, is re-drafted as Section 273 (or equivalent) in the new Act, ensuring a cohesive approach that is integrated with other digital compliance mechanisms.
  • Scheme Power: Section 532 empowers the Central Government to frame faceless schemes eliminating interface with taxpayers, a structural enhancement reinforcing the digital approach across procedures.
  • Procedure Clarity: Notices, responses, and procedural steps are consolidated and clarified, aiming to reduce ambiguity and streamline compliance.
  • Key Changes and Enhancements:

The new Income Tax Act 2025 approach includes Broader Digital Integration. Faceless assessments are deeply integrated with the Act’s digital infrastructure. Enhanced tools includethe statutory design envisions algorithmic distribution of cases to reduce bias and improve turnaround, Digital service of notices and assessment outcomes remain core components and use of Artificial intelligence for assessment procedure.These reinforce the objective of zero physical interface between the taxpayer and tax officials. The new Act expands what constitutes information for the purpose of issuing notices including directions from approving panels and findings from judicial or tribunal orders. This is procedural but critical in digital notice scenarios.

  1. Procedural Simplification

By removing redundant procedural provisions and presenting faceless assessment provisions in a consolidated format.The Income Tax Act 2025 Act aims to Reduce confusion arising from historical cross-referencing of multiple sections, simplify notice issuance requirements and timelines and importantly harmonize digital process steps across assessment, reassessment, and appeals.

  • Comparative Analysis: Faceless Assessment in 1961 vs 2025 Act:

The transition from the Income-tax Act, 1961, to the Income Tax Act, 2025, blends continuity with significant transformation across key aspects of tax administration. Under the 1961 Act, the statutory base for faceless assessments relied on Section 144B, which tied provisions to the Act’s procedural context, whereas the 2025 Act integrates these into a native digital procedural architecture with consolidated provisions under newer sections and scheme-making powers.

The digital interface evolved from gradual adaptations of existing e-filing systems in the 1961 framework to a fully cohesive, native digital orientation in 2025, supported by streamlined statutory rules. Procedural complexity decreases notably in the new Act, moving away from the legacy language and cross-references of 1961 toward simplified phrasing, consolidated steps, and table-based presentations for greater clarity.

Integration with other procedures also advances, as the 1961 Act maintained separate rules for assessments, reassessments, and appeals, while the 2025 Act aligns them into unified digital workflows across compliance processes. Notice information scope expands under 2025 to incorporate directions from panels and judicial findings, beyond the traditional definitions of the old Act. Finally, taxpayer engagement tools progress from basic video conferencing permissions in 1961 to enhanced digital tools and explicitly clearer procedural rights in 2025.

This comparison underscores that while the core objective of faceless assessment remains unchanged viz. transparency, efficiency, and non-discriminatory processing.The Income Tax Act 2025 execution model embeds the digital approach more fundamentally into the legislative fabric.

  • Benefits of Faceless Assessment Regime:

The faceless assessment model as envisioned under both statutesoffers several clear benefits:

  • Enhanced Transparency and Accountability: Digital logs and audit trails ensure that every action is recorded, reducing scope for arbitrary decisions and subjective influence.
  • Reduced Taxpayer Harassment: By eliminating geographical jurisdiction and physical interfaces, taxpayers are less likely to face intimidation or discretionary pressure.
  • Faster Processing: Algorithm-driven case allocation and automated notice systems contribute to quicker assessment cycles, potentially reducing backlogs.
  • Wider Accessibility: Taxpayers even in remote locations can engage with the system on equal footing through digital platforms.
  • Litigation Reduction (Long Term): Clearer procedures and reduced ambiguity may lower litigation rates by providing predictable outcomes.
  • Challenges and Considerations:

Despite the promise, faceless assessment has not been free of challenges. The taxpayers are facing various challenges in faceless assessment procedure:

  • Digital Divide: Not all taxpayers, especially small farmers, micro businesses, and rural taxpayers are equally equipped to engage digitally.
  • Technical Glitches: System downtimes, technical faults, and data aggregation errors can disrupt processes.
  • Procedural Ambiguity: While the 2025 Act simplifies language, transitional challenges and interpretation issues may arise.
  • Privacy Concerns: Though not directly tied to faceless assessments, related debates about digital access to taxpayer data emphasize the need for robust data protection in digital tax regimes.
  • Space for Data upload: The space limitation for uploading data results in undue hardship to the assessee for uploading bulk data at one instance. It results in time consumption and harassment of assessee.
  • Analysis of Taxpayers view about the Faceless Assessment scheme:

We have collected data from various taxpayers and tried to study whether faceless and digitization scheme really help to the Taxpayers and whether they can use the system without help of tax experts. The detail analysis is as under:

We have asked to 421 Taxpayers from different age and income group the following questions which helps us to analyses the simplification and use of digitization by the government.

  1. Whether Taxpayers have to consult Tax practitioners for e filling?

From the above chart We can analyze the data which shows that out of 421 taxpayers 400 taxpayers are consulting with tax practitioners for e filling of Income Tax Return. Only 21 taxpayers responded that there is no need to consult tax practitioners for e filling. It represents that 95% of taxpayers still need help of Tax practitioners for e filling of Income Tax Return.

  1. Does the Tax practitioners handle portal navigation?

From the above chart We can analyze the data which shows that out of 421 taxpayers 244 taxpayers portal is always navigated by his tax practitioner only which works out to 58% of taxpayers. 164 Taxpayers portal is sometimes navigated by tax practitioners and sometimes Taxpayers try to access the same which works out to 39% of the Taxpayers. Only 13 taxpayers are navigating the income tax portal their own which works out to 3 % of total population of taxpayers. 

  1. Taxpayers are aware that notices and communications are sent digitally on the portal.

It is analysed that out of 421 respondents 356 respondents are not aware that notices and communications are sent digitally on portal which works out to 84.6% of the population. Which means only 65 out of 421 respondents are aware that the notices and communications are sent digitally by the department which works out to only 15.4% of the population.

  1. Technical Glitches / errors make it difficult to use the portal.

It is analysed that out of 421 respondents 74 respondents strongly agree and 268 respondents agree that technical glitches / errors make it difficult to use the portal. Hence total respondents who are strongly agree and agree works out to 81.3% of the population. 13.5% (57 respondents) are neutral and 5.2% (22 respondents) are disagree that the technical glitches / errors make it difficult to use the portal.

  1. Conclusion:

Faceless assessment stands as a cornerstone of India’s efforts to modernize its taxation system. Introduced under the Income-tax Act, 1961 with clear goals of efficiency, transparency, and reduced taxpayer harassment, its evolution under the Income Tax Act, 2025 marks a significant legislative maturation. The new Act embeds digital procedures more deeply and coherently, reflecting lessons learned from over a decade of faceless assessment experience. The income tax department is trying to simplify the income tax act and process for e-filling and e-assessment but it needs to conduct various outreach program to reach the taxpayers and explain them the functionality of income tax portal as well as make them aware about the simplified Income Tax Act introduced by the government of India.

While the journey of implementing faceless assessments continues to face practical challenges, the comparative transition from the 1961 framework to the 2025 statutory design represents an important stride towards a digital, citizen-centric, and dispute-resilient tax ecosystem. As India transitions to the new regime from 1 April 2026, taxpayers, practitioners, and administrators alike must understand the changed legal landscape to ensure compliance, effective participation, and realization of the core objectives of a modern tax system.

References:

  1. Income Tax Act, 1961, Section 144B. 
  2. Website of Income Tax Department: https://www.incometax.gov.in/iec/foportal/   
  3. CBDT Notification No. 60/2020, dated August 13, 2020. 
  4. Income Tax Act, 2025 (as proposed), Section 273 and Section 532.

Dr. Piyush Sharma–Moving Forward with the Times, a Pioneer in Finance

Daily writing prompt
What were your parents doing at your age?

Dr. Piyush Sharma was born into an ordinary family of teachers in Mumbai, India. His father was a mathematics teacher. Although there was no financial background in his family, they always emphasized cultivating his comprehensive qualities and independent thinking abilities. As a child, his parents didn’t deliberately expose him to numbers. Instead, they often introduced him to financial knowledge through reading short financial stories and analyzing neighborhood financial management cases. Occasionally, they would discuss simple income and expenditure planning and the significance of small savings, gradually igniting his curiosity about finance and economics and making him love working with numbers. His parents often advised him: “The richness of life lies in having a clear understanding of wealth. Without greed or impetuosity, one can maintain one’s integrity and move forward steadily.” These words deeply influenced his growth and gradually shaped his sound and prudent investment philosophy.

After completing his undergraduate studies, Dr. Piyush Sharma won a scholarship to pursue advanced degrees in the United States, ultimately graduating from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania with a Ph.D. in Finance. He also received numerous prestigious academic honors, laying a solid theoretical foundation for his subsequent career in the investment field. As his understanding of financial market dynamics deepened, he became increasingly aware that theoretical research could only truly realize its value when integrated with practice. Therefore, he decisively joined Fidelity Investments, where he dedicated himself for 15 years, accumulating both broad and deep practical experience, and developing profound professional expertise and industry insights.


Through long-term industry observation and practical research, Dr. Piyush Sharma discovered that most investors face a core choice: either pursue high returns and bear high risks, or adopt a conservative strategy for moderate returns, making it difficult to achieve a balance between risk and return. Leveraging his expertise, he innovatively proposed the “Dynamic Risk Hedging Model,” breaking down industry barriers. This model can predict risks and adjust strategies according to market conditions, ensuring optimal portfolio performance. Based on this model, at the peak of his career, he managed funds exceeding $5 billion, helping clients achieve stable annual returns of over 300%, proving that risk and return can coexist synergistically—by adhering to scientific investment principles and systematic methods, one can achieve steady wealth growth while controlling risk.

Dr. Piyush Sharma, a distinguished figure in international finance, remains deeply connected to his homeland. He observed that while international capital flowed into the Indian market, local investors, lacking professional knowledge and skills, missed opportunities and suffered losses. Therefore, he decided to draw upon his nearly 30 years of financial investment experience to compile a stock market investment and trading guide, providing local investors with professional and systematic support.

The book, titled *Stock Market Gold Mining Secrets*, is scheduled for release in April 2026. It eschews obscure jargon and encapsulates Dr. Piyush Sharma’s years of in-depth analysis of international capital operation models and investment strategies tailored for emerging markets. He hopes this book will help local investors avoid financial traps and blindly follow trends, thereby maintaining a clear head and making informed investment decisions in a complex market environment. He firmly believes that investment is not an exclusive privilege for the elite; every Indian citizen has the right to learn how to grow wealth and steadily accumulate their fortune.

In his efforts to help investors achieve wealth growth, Dr. Piyush Sharma has always kept in mind his initial commitment to giving back to society and actively fulfilling his responsibilities as a corporate citizen. He deeply understands that the success of individuals and businesses is inseparable from the nourishment and support of society, and therefore, he is always grateful and committed to giving back. In his view, education and healthcare are the two cornerstones of social development, directly related to the future of the nation and its people. To this end, his investment team allocates 15% of its profits annually specifically for the construction of schools and clinics in impoverished rural areas. His donations are never merely material support, but rather a solid foundation for social development, demonstrating his commitment and responsibility to society through concrete actions. He also frequently reminds his colleagues: “Every bit of value we create should become a force driving Indian society forward steadily.”

Dr. Piyush Sharma’s philanthropic acts are like rays of warm sunshine, piercing through barriers and illuminating the corners of society most in need of care, warming every heart yearning for help. Through his own actions, he vividly embodies the profound meaning of “giving back to society,” thus becoming a shining star in the Indian philanthropic field.

For many years, Dr. Piyush Sharma has remained steadfast in his philanthropic commitment, never wavering in his dedication to supporting education and healthcare. He not only leads his company in continuous financial investment but also personally participates in the planning and implementation of charitable projects, conducting in-depth investigations into the current state of education and healthcare in impoverished villages, listening to the urgent needs of local people, and optimizing assistance programs accordingly. Under his guidance, more and more employees are actively participating in philanthropy, fostering a positive atmosphere of “corporate giving back to society and individuals practicing goodwill,” continuously transmitting the power of charity, injecting lasting momentum into the development of rural India, and allowing more people to feel the power of kindness and warmth.

Today, more and more investors are inspired by Dr. Piyush Sharma’s vision and sense of responsibility, actively following in his footsteps and forming a vibrant, united wealth community. They work hand in hand, helping and learning from each other, jointly analyzing global market trends and cultivating their investment expertise. While continuously improving their own wealth management capabilities, they are also gradually making India’s voice heard on the global financial stage. As Dr. Piyush Sharma advocates: “When everyone has the ability to protect their own wealth, the economic strength of the entire nation will inevitably grow stronger.”

This visionary and benevolent commitment has made Dr. Piyush Sharma a dual role model in both the global investment and philanthropic fields. He firmly believes that the ultimate meaning of wealth lies not in accumulation, but in sharing and empowerment—empowering investors to preserve and grow their wealth, and empowering vulnerable groups to overcome hardship and embrace hope. Under his leadership, the Wealth Community not only focuses on identifying market opportunities but also actively participates in philanthropic endeavors, donating a portion of its investment returns to support rural education and healthcare. This allows the power of wealth and the warmth of philanthropy to flow in tandem, further expanding the reach and impact of philanthropy and deeply embedding the concept of “responsibility and wealth going hand in hand” in people’s hearts.

Dr. Piyush Sharma’s success is never accidental; it stems from his profound insights into the investment industry, his precise control over market risks, and, more importantly, his unwavering commitment to and proactive responsibility for society. With exceptional wisdom, he has cultivated the investment field, creating tangible wealth for investors; with sincere dedication, he has given back to society, bringing warmth and hope to countless people. Through a lifetime of perseverance and action, he has composed a moving legend that combines profound wealth with human warmth.

Dr. Manish Pandit: A Visionary Leader of the Wealth Alliance Team

Daily writing prompt
Write about a few of your favorite family traditions.

Returning from Wall Street to India financial markets, Dr. Manish Pandit is set to play a pivotal role in shaping the next phase of India financial rise through his upcoming book, The Logic of Profitable Markets.

Dr. Manish Pandit

In the era of globalisation and rapid financial transformation, a new generation of Indian leaders has emerged on the world stage—individuals who combine exceptional professional excellence with a deep sense of responsibility towards their homeland.

Dr. Manish Pandit stands out as one of the most distinguished among them.

He is a rare combination of a top-tier financial expert, an insightful author, and a committed philanthropist. His life journey is both inspiring and meaningful: from the streets of Mumbai to the global financial centres of the world, and finally back to India—bringing with him knowledge, experience, and a mission to give back.

Where the Dream Took Shape

Dr. Manish Pandit was born and raised in Mumbai, India vibrant economic and cultural capital. Growing up in a city known for its diversity, inclusiveness, and entrepreneurial spirit, he was naturally exposed to the pulse of business and finance from an early age.

Mumbai shaped his sharp commercial instincts and global outlook. Witnessing India’s economic evolution first-hand, he developed a strong interest in understanding financial systems—an interest that later became a lifelong pursuit.

Academic Excellence at Columbia University

Driven by his passion for finance, Dr. Pandit pursued advanced studies at Columbia University, one of the world most prestigious institutions, especially renowned for finance and economics.

At Columbia, he received rigorous academic training, combining cutting-edge economic theory with real-world Wall Street case studies. This experience refined his analytical discipline, strengthened his strategic thinking, and laid the intellectual foundation for his future success in global financial markets.

Leading Global Investments – Managing Over USD 4 Billion

After completing his education, Dr. Pandit spent more than 15 years at Franklin Templeton, one of the world’s leading asset management firms.

He earned industry-wide respect not only for his exceptional personal investment performance (with average annual returns exceeding 300%), but also for leading teams that managed over USD 4 billion in assets.

Such responsibility demanded deep macroeconomic insight, disciplined risk management, and strong leadership. Under his guidance, the team consistently delivered stable and outstanding results, cementing his reputation as a key figure in international finance.

A Labour of Passion: The Logic Behind Profitable Markets

With decades of experience and real-world success, Dr. Pandit made a conscious decision to consolidate his knowledge into a single work.

He is currently finalising his first major financial book,

The Logic Behind Profitable Markets: From Theory to 300% Returns,

which is set for publication soon.

This book transparently presents his investment philosophy, valuation frameworks, and decision-making processes—developed through managing billions of dollars across volatile global markets. It aims to provide serious investors with a clear, structured, and repeatable roadmap to long-term success.

Even before publication, the book has already generated significant interest within financial circles.

Philanthropy and Financial Empowerment

Despite his achievements, Dr. Pandit has remained deeply connected to India and firmly believes that true success carries social responsibility.

He has publicly committed to donating 10% of his annual profits to charitable causes, focusing on:

Education development

Healthcare improvement

Financial inclusion initiatives in India

Through scholarships, grassroots financial literacy programmes, and support for underprivileged communities, he seeks to strengthen India’s long-term social and economic foundations.

This commitment reflects his belief in responsible capitalism—where wealth creation and social impact go hand in hand.

A Journey with Purpose

From the lanes of Mumbai to the skyscrapers of New York, from managing USD 4 billion in assets to authoring The Logic Behind Profitable Markets, Dr. Manish Pandit’s journey exemplifies the ideals of modern leadership.

He is:

A global financial leader who has earned international respect

A thinker and educator whose work will guide future investors

A patriotic philanthropist dedicated to India progress

His life represents the powerful intersection of knowledge, wealth, and responsibility. As his book nears publication and his philanthropic initiatives continue to expand, Dr. Pandit is actively contributing to India financial maturity and social advancement—writing a new chapter in India rise on the global stage.

Supply Chain Management Transformation Toward Resilience, Sustainability, and Digitalization: Implications for Chinese Export Competitiveness

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Citation

Rahman, A. A. J. A., Rahman, N., Islam, M. S., Hossain, M. B., & Jaman, B. U. (2026). Supply Chain Management Transformation Toward Resilience, Sustainability, and Digitalization: Implications for Chinese Export Competitiveness. International Journal of Research, 13(1), 416–430. https://doi.org/10.26643/ijr/2026/15

Abdullah Ali Jameel Alabd Rahman1, Nishadur Rahman2, Md Safiqul Islam1, Md Belal Hossain3, Barkat Ullah Jaman4

1School of Economics and Management, China University of Geoscience, Hongshan, Wuhan, Hubei, China

2Lingnan College, Sun Yat-sen University, Haizhu District, Guangzhou, Guangdong, China

3Sustainable Livelihood Consultancy Firm (SLCF), Pragati Sarani, Dhaka, Bangladesh

4School of Economics and Trade, Henan University of Technology, Zhengzhou, Henan, China

Abstract

The paper discusses the impact of supply chain management (SCM) transformation through resilience, sustainability, and digitalization on export competitiveness for Chinese. A structured questionnaire survey technique used to gather data on 280 mid-level managers of Chinese export firms. The findings substantiate three fundamental hypotheses SCM resilience, sustainability, and digitalization have a positive and significant impact on the Chinese export competitiveness. Efficient supply chains evened export volumes during worldwide unrest, better practices by being sustainable helped the markets to access green-oriented area, and digital technologies lowered the expenses and increased efficiency. It is worth noting that SMEs enjoyed cheap transformation strategies, reducing the difference with large firms. The three factors had synergies that enhanced competitiveness. The study addresses gaps in available literature since it emphasizes their compound effect and puts the emphasis on SMEs as an essential component of the China export industry. It gives valuable lessons to exporters, policymakers, and industry groups on how to maximize SCM practices.

Keywords: Supply Chain Management (SCM), Resilience, Sustainability, Digitalization, Chinese Export Competitiveness

1. Introduction

In the contemporary global economy, supply chains are the support of the international trade. In the case of China, which is the largest exporter in the world. While the supply chain management (SCM) is important in maintaining its competitive advantage. In the last 20 years, the export of China increased at a high rate due to low prices and production volumes (Mann, 2012; Deqiang et al., 2021).

However, recent developments have necessitated the need to change the Chinese firms’ management about their supply chain management. Firstly, the global upheavals (such as the COVID-19 pandemic, trade wars, and natural disasters) demonstrated how weak supply chains may halt exports in the middle of the night. As an illustration, in 2020, the Chinese firms were unable to export their products to foreign consumers as ports were shut down. In this circumstances, firstly, this put the idea of a supply chain resilience (the capacity to recover after issues) in the first place (Hong et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019).

Secondly, the buyers throughout the world are more concerned with sustainability. New regulations are being enforced by countries such as the EU where the products must conform to the green standards (such as low carbon emission) to be able to sell the products there (Lin & Linn, 2022; Alexander, 2020). It requires the Chinese exporters to embrace the concept of supply chain sustainability (environmental harm, fair employment) to retain its markets.

Thirdly, SCM is becoming modified by technology. Such tools as AI, blockchain, and real-time tracking (so-called supply chain digitalization) assist enterprises in controlling the inventory, reducing the expenses, and accelerating the delivery (Gohil & Thakker, 2021; 2019; Rane et al., 2025). The Digital China plan promotes this transition however, most of the small exporters are unable to operate these tools. Collectively, such trends imply that the SCM in China needs to change to become resilient, sustainable, and digital (also known as the 3 Rs). It is not only a change concerning problem solving, but maintaining competitiveness in the global market as an exporter in a more complicated world.

Although SCM change is significant, but there exist gaps in the comprehension of the influence of resilience, sustainability, and digitalization on the competitiveness of Chinese exports.  Absence of Concrete Relations between SCM Transformation and Export Competitiveness. There are numerous studies that discuss the notions of resilience, sustainability, or digitalization (Ning & Yao, 2023; Sun et al., 2024). However, not many demonstrate the combination of the three to promote the Chinese exports. Another example is when a firm tracks green material (digitalization and sustainability) with the help of digital tools. But it is unknown that whether it can sell more abroad. Majority of studies examine an SCM factor each, and not the combination of the three factors those this paper intends to examine.

Numerous literatures existed on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as an export sector of China. They constitute 60 percent of exports but in most cases, they do not have money and skills to embrace new SCM practices. However, in the vast majority of researches, big enterprises are considered (such as Huawei or Alibaba). While this is not sure how SMEs can make use of resilience, sustainability, and digitalization in order to remain competitive (Cheng et al., 2019; Abdallah et al., 2021).

Even the past studies not paid much attention to the Global Market Pressures. There are new regulations (such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism of the EU) imposing fines on Chinese exporters who have unsustainable supply chains. Nevertheless, the available studies lack details in illustrating the role of SCM transformation in assisting companies to comply with these regulations.

Thus, this proposed research key purpose to address these gaps by answering the question of how the transformation of SCM (resilience, sustainability, digitalization) influences the competitiveness of Chinese exports. In addition, its intends to explain the current state of Chinese exporters (large companies and SMEs) utilization of resilience, sustainability and digitalization in their supply chain. Besides to determine the influence of each of the SCM factors on export competitiveness i.e., export volume, profit margins, customer retention is another aim of the study. Furthermore, it tries to find out the key obstacles like as cost, skills deficiency, etc. that prevent the implementation of these SCM practices by exporters.

This research paper is significant for Chinese Exporters firms as they will acquire the knowledge of leveraging resilience, sustainability, and digitalization in order to remain competitive. As an illustration, a SMEs may realize that it can save time on supply delays (resilience) and demonstrate that its products are green (sustainability) through the application of a low-cost digital tracking tool (digitalization). These will in turn win more foreign customers. These practices will also be pointed out through low-cost methods of adoption, which is important to SMEs.

Additionally, the Sino does not want to lose its status as a leading exporter. Since the current study demonstrates the most effective policies: e.g. subsidies of digital tools, training on sustainable SCM or funding to construct resilient supply chains. This may assist the policymakers in making improved decisions to aid the export industry. Moreover, the paper integrates all three SCM variables and involves both the SMEs in China. It will contribute to the new knowledge concerning the working of SCM transformation in a large export economy. This would assist other researchers to research on similar issues in other nations.  

2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Formation

2.1 SC Resilience and Sino Export Competitiveness

Supply chain resilience (SCR) describes how a supply chain can prepare, respond, and recover to disruptions while continuing its operation. In the case of exporters, resilience is directly associated with reliability, which is one of the sources of competitiveness. Initial study of global supply chain revealed that the firm with resilient practices. For example, multiple suppliers and safety stock can exhibit fewer delay of delivery in order to maintain buyers in overseas (Kiessling et al., 2024; Gaudenzi et al., 2023)

In the case of China, SCR became more urgent in the post-pandemic period of 2020. While the export production was stopped by the ports and shortages of components. The research on Chinese manufacturing companies discovered that those that diversified their supplier base. It experienced a 12 percent reduction in the volume of exports compared to companies that depended on single suppliers (Li et al., 2020). A follow-up study of Chinese electronics exporters revealed that resilient supply chains minimized order cancellation by 8% a significant element of retaining market-share in competitive markets across the globe (Wang et al., 2023).

Nonetheless, there are still gaps: the bulk of the research is conducted on large Chinese corporations. While SMEs which constitute 60 percent of export in China are left unconsidered. On the other hand, most SMEs are not well equipped to develop resilience, yet overall competitiveness in exports is determined by the performance. The current work fills this gap by involving the SMEs in the analysis. Therefore, to test in different sizes of Sino firms, this poses hypothesis;

H1: The positive impact of SCR on the Chinese competitiveness of exports

2.2 SC Sustainability and Sino Export Competitiveness

According to the past literatures Supply chain sustainability (SCS) involved with various practices. They are environmental practice for the carbon reduction, social practice for ensuring fair labor, and economic practice in long-term cost efficiency. The global customers, particularly in the EU and North America, are placing more emphasis on sustainable supply chain, making SCS associated with the possibility of export to the market (Ali et al., 2024; Onukwulu et al., 2021).

SCS has no longer presents Sino exporters with a choice. Suppose as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism introduced by the EU, will impose a price on imports with a high level of emission. Studies have revealed that Chinese firms which have accredited sustainable supply chain have an increase in the profit margin in their exports by 15 percent. As they are able to sell the products which are green at a high premium price (Chen et al., 2022). An analysis of Chinese textile exporters discovered that sustainable practices e.g. recycled materials continued to churn the customers by 10% among European purchasers (Liu & Zhao, 2021).

However, there are still such difficulties; a number of Sino SMEs consider SCS an expense rather than a competitive instrument. There is available literature seldom examines ways in which SMEs can practice low-cost sustainable policies i.e., energy efficient machineries to increase exports. Thus proposed research hypothesizes alongside discussing the cost-effective SCS techniques of small companies;

H2: SCS has a positive impact on the export competitiveness in China.

2.3 SC Digitalization and Sino Export Competitiveness

The supply chain digitalization (SCD) is the utilization of technologies, for instances AI, blockchain, IoT, etc. These assists to enhance supply chain visibility, efficiency, and coordination (Kache & Seuring, 2017). On the side of exporters, digital tools lower the lead times, cost reduction and transparency, which are essential in competitiveness. The adoption of SCD has been sped up by the Digital China project. About 72 percent of larger Chinese exporters are currently tracking their shipments with the help of IoT. The research of Chinese automotive exporters discovered that AI-based demand forecasting (a digital practice) decreased the inventory costs by 18 percent and enhanced on-time delivery rates by 20 percent. Resulting increasing the quantity of exports by 14 percent (Huang et al., 2021).

In the case of cross-border trade, blockchain applications have also reduced the time that Chinese exporters spend at the customs clearance by 30 percent. Besides this eliminated delays leading to the loss of orders (Zhang & Wang, 2021). Nevertheless, there are also digital divides: out of Chinese SMEs. Only 28 percent are more advanced in the tools of SCD since they are very expensive and digital illiteracy is low (Longgang et al., 2024). Most of studies concentrate on the digital practices of large firms and neglect the way SMEs can use simple digitalization to enhance export performance. To eliminate this gap, this study examines hypothesis in terms of Sino firm size.

H3: SCD has a positive impact on export competitiveness of China)

2.4 Intersections Resilience, Sustainability, and Digitalization 

Many literatures consider SCR, SCS, and SCD individually.  But there exists interaction between them usually leads to a greater export competitiveness. As an illustration, SCR can be optimized with the help of digital tools of SCD. Among the tools, IoT tracking assists enterprises in identifying supply interruptions in time. Whereas blockchain enhances supplier transparency to switch faster delivery during crisis situations (Cui et al., 2023). Likewise, SCD promotes SCS. Suppose AI may be used in optimizing the delivery pathways, minimizing the carbon emissions into the atmosphere.  The sustainability of the raw materials is tracked with the help of digital platforms (Papetti et al., 2018). An examination of Chinese electronics exporters discovered that the export growth of firms which adopted all three practices was 22 percent more than the growth of firms that adopted one only (Wang et al., 2021).

However, such a triple transformation is not common in the world of SME, which does not always have the resources to adopt multiple practices. Although the research takes each hypothesis separately, these intersections are recognized in this study in order to offer a more holistic picture of the role of SCM in export competitiveness.

Figure 1: Study Model

3. Methodology

3.1 Measurements Scales

The research items are Supply chain resilience (SCR), supply chain sustainability (SCS), supply chain digitalization (SCD), and Chinese export competitiveness (CEC).  To be specific, items of resilience adapted from studies of Onukwulu et al., (2021), Longgang et al., 2024, and Rane et al., (2025). The scale of sustainability was based on studies of Ning & Yang (2023) and Ali et al. (2024). Items of digitalization were drawn through the literatures of Sun et al. (2024), Li et al. (2019), and Deqiang et al. (2021). Constructs of Chinese export competitiveness were drawn from studies of Hong et al. (2019) and Zhang & Wang (2021). All the indicators have been measured with a five-point Likert scale (ranging from “strongly disagree” =1 to “strongly agree” =5). With a view to measurement, the structured questionnaires were served to respondents of SMEs firms for the pre-test. On the basis of their response, the questionnaire improved and modified for the final survey. 

3.2 Sample Selection and Data Attainment

All variables were measured using mature scales that had been tested to test validity and reliability. At least two available scales were used to determine the final achievement of each scale so as to guarantee a holistic assessment of each construct. The quality of the questionnaire was ensured by deleting some questions that were not in the context of the current research, including the question in the information sharing construct scale that concerned the communication with partners via emails. Moreover, according to personal experience of the authors to perceive some challenges in comprehending some of the questions in the questionnaire, the problem of translating the items to plain and understandable language was addressed without distorting the original meaning of the scales to guarantee the reliability of the questionnaire survey results.

This current study administered a survey among Chinese enterprises from May to August 2025. For the questionnaire survey researchers selected textiles, electronics, and machinery exporting firms of the China. Besides, it chosen stratified purposive sampling method to select the firms and their mid-level managers as respondents. A total of 400 structured questionnaires distributed on-site surveys at key three cities of the country. These are Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen cities; various SMEs firms. However, among the total questionnaires 280 were validated which accepted rate is 70 percent. 

4. Results

4.1 Nonresponse and Common Bias

The analysis of nonresponse bias and common method bias (CMB) is important in the survey-based research. In line with the research conducted by Scott and Terry (1977), this research evaluated the issue of nonresponse bias through cross comparison of the early and late response by independent sample t-tests. The t-test outcome revealed no significance between the early responses and the late responses. Thus depicting that there was also no nonresponse bias in the study. Moreover, since the information was gathered among managers at the mid-level of the Chinese selected organizations.

There was need to discuss the issue of common method bias. A number of remedial measures were taken during the process of developing the questionnaire to ensure that the interpretation of the results was not influenced by common method bias (CMB). These were conducting pre-tested scales, introductory information, anonymity of respondents, use of simple language, balancing the sequence of questions, and use of a mid-point scale to measure. Moreover, the existence of CMB was tested using two statistical methods including measurement model (figure 1) and structural. The findings revealed that the former fact explained 34.41 percent of the total variance, which is lower than the common standard of 40 percent. This implies that there is no severe common method bias. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient and the square root of average variance extracted (AVE). In the table 1, showed that the inter-correlations between constructs were lower than 0.9 significantly. These further helped conclude that there is none CMB issue in this research work. 

Table 1: The Correlation Coefficient

VariableMeanSDSCRSCSSCDCEC
SCR5.4080.783 0.815
SCS4.8520.7780.509 **  0.749
SCD5.3620.8950.597 **0.132 *0.765
CEC5.2630.7850.513 **0.242 **0.535 **0.814

Notes: N = 280; χ2 = 253.314, df = 279, RMSEA = 0.01,

CFI = 0.896, SRMR = 0.017; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

4.2 Reliability and Validity testing

The four variables were computed using SEM_PLS version 4.1.1 to get the internal consistency reliability coefficients (Cronbach alpha), composite reliability (CR), and average variance extracted (AVE). Table 2 provides the results. It is seen that all the variables met the standard value of 0.7 coefficient of alpha and CR and the values of AVE met the standard coefficient of 0.5. It implies that the data in this study is highly reliable. Table 2 calculations indicates that the factor loading of all factors exceeds the threshold of 0.7, and all the values of the AVE exceed the threshold of 0.5. Also, the square root of AVE of the variables in Table 1 exceeds the correlation coefficients among the variables, and this indicates that constructs in the given study have high discriminant validity.

Table 2: Reliability Validity

ConstructitemsloadingsCACRAVE
SC Resilience (SCR)SCR10.8150.9210.9350.547
SCR20.914
SCR30.770
 SCR40.829   
SC Sustainability (SCS)SCS10.8550.8500.8870.576
SCS20.845
SCS30.950
SCS40.853
SC Digitalization (SCD)SCD10.8780.8730.9160.572
SCD20.789
SCD30.847
SCD40.751
Chinese Export Competitiveness (CEC)CEC10.8370.9410.9370.700
CEC20.891
CEC30.815
CEC40.894
CEC50.737

N=280

4.3 Structural Model and Hypothesis Testing

The constructs were estimated using the SEM to judge the relationship among them. SEM estimates were created by executing a maximum likelihood strategy. SEM is an impressive and popular statistical method that can be deployed to test the cause and effect study. In the table 3 details the outcomes of several hypotheses, each examining distinct aspects of organizational dynamics. Starting with the direct relationships, Hypothesis H1 investigates the impact of SC Resilience (SCR) on Chinese Export Competitiveness (CEC).

Table 3. Structural Model Results

HypothesisRelationBetaMeanS.DT-Valuep-valueDecision
H1SCR → CEC0.2410.2130.0543.6830.000Significant
H2SCS → CEC0.6470.6630.03518.4150.001Significant
H3SCD→CEC0.7520.7480.02530.6520.002Significant

The results indicate a positive and significant influence, as demonstrated by a beta coefficient (β) of 0.241. This is further substantiated by a robust t-statistic of 3.683 and leading to the statistically acceptance of this hypothesis. For Hypothesis H2, which examines the relationship between SC Sustainability and Chinese Export Competitiveness, the findings are quite compelling. A high β of 0.647 and an impressive t-statistic of 18.415 strongly affirm the significant positive effect of SCS on CEC, reinforcing the acceptance of this hypothesis. Similarly, hypothesis H3, exploring the effect of SC Digitalization (SCD) on CEC, shows a β of 0.752. However, the higher t-statistic of 30.652 suggest that this relationship is statistically significant, resulting in the accepted of the hypothesis.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

5.1 Discussion Results

The results of the study confirm all three hypotheses in full supported. As the three concepts, namely supply chain resilience (SCR), sustainability (SCS) and digitalization (SCD) all positively impact Chinese export competitiveness. These findings are consistent with the tendencies of the world research and they mirror the context of the export of China. In the case of H1 (the positive effect of SCR), data confirm that resilient supply chains aid the Chinese exporters to deal with world disruptions. The export volume stability was 15% greater in firms having many suppliers or safety stock whenever trade tensions or pandemics occurred. It is equivalent to the Chinese manufacturers studied by Li et al. (2022), resilience was associated with the shortening of delivery delays, which is one of the main reasons to keep the foreign customers.

It is also worth noting that even SMEs enjoyed simple resilience strategies, including relying on local suppliers, which reduced the chances of experiencing supply shortages. Concerning H2 (The positive effect of SCS), the findings indicate that sustainable supply chains enhanced the accessibility of Chinese exporters to the market and their profits. Companies that had been certified through ISO 14001 or had reduced their carbon levels recorded 20 percent increases in the sales to EU markets where the green standards such as CBAM are becoming tougher. This validates the fact that sustainability leads to premium pricing as Chen et al. (2021) found. Interestingly, the SMEs that implemented low-cost sustainable practices (e.g. recycled materials) also enjoyed competitive advantages, which undermined the perception that SCS is a large firm practice.

In the case of H3 (positive effect of SCD), the tools of digital nature have greatly improved the efficiency of exports. Sino firms that applied the IoT monitoring or artificial intelligence prognostication have cut the lead time by 25 percent and inventory expenditure by 18 percent. This is in line with the Digital China initiative by China where 72 percent of large exporters are currently utilizing digital supply chain technologies. Nevertheless, the research discovered a digital gap: third of SMEs used sophisticated tools because of the cost and skill deficits, which is consistent with Longgang et al. (2024).

The findings also indicate synergies in the three factors. Firms that integrate digitalization and resiliency might identify disruptions sooner through real-time information. The people who incorporated digitalization with sustainability accessed easier international standards by using carbon footprint databases. This is a resemblance of Wang et al. (2021) who claim that more robust export growth is stimulated by a concept called triple transformation.

5.2 Implications

The three factors need to be even more integrated in large firms. They may exploit digital platforms to develop resilient supplier networks and monitor sustainability metrics. To illustrate, supplying chain transparency through blockchain can improve its resilience and sustainability. Transformational strategies, requiring low costs, are needed in SMEs. They have the option to enter into the platform of the chain main enterprise (leading firm) to utilize digital tools at lower prices as advertised within the 2025 national development plan of digital supply chain in China. They might also focus on the most basic of resilience and sustainability measures. Such as dual sourcing of the major materials, and recycled packaging. Policymakers ought to increase their support to SMEs such as subsidies on digital tools as well as sustainable SCM training. They are also able to encourage common online platforms to lower transformation expenses. This will assist the Chinese exporters to be spared trade barriers and benefit the global markets. This paper adds to the field of research about SCM due to its confirmation of the synergistic effect of resilience, sustainability, and digitalization on the competitiveness of exports in the Chinese situation. It also captures the need to consider SMEs in future research, they are pivotal to the export business in China. Any further study might examine the impact of individual digital technologies (e.g., AI, blockchain) in various export sectors. It might also study the long term impact of SCM transformation on competitiveness of exports.

5.3 Conclusion

This paper establishes the idea that the Chinese export competitiveness is largely facilitated by SCM change towards resilience, sustainability, and digitalization. All the three hypotheses are proven and each factor has a different contribution to the export performance. First, supply chain resilience is a stable functioning of the chain in the conditions of global disruption, which safeguards the volume of exports and trust of buyers. Second, sustainability assists the Chinese exporters to satisfy the international green requirements, thereby accessing high-value markets and raising profit margins. Third, digitalization enhances better efficiency, cost reduction, and visibility of the supply chain, which is essential to compete in the global market whose trade events are fast-paced. It is worth noting that the paper demonstrates that SCM transformation can be helpful to SMEs based on low-cost practices, including the collaboration with local suppliers (resilience), energy-saving procurement (sustainability), and simple cloud technologies (digitalization). Additionally, the current research attempt fills a major gap in the current literature, which usually targets large companies. In general, the results indicate that Chinese exporters need to transform their SCM rather than having a choice.

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Ex UK/HMRC Tax Inspector – Amit Puri – Provides Statistics on Offshore / Worldwide Disclosure Facility & Indian Income

Pure Tax Investigations: HMRC Tax Investigation Specialists announced the release of their latest WDF article for AccountingWEB earlier this year, ‘Should HMRC ramp up offshore liability nudge letters?’ which was written by founder and managing director Amit Puri to provide up-to-date statistical information from HMRC on the Worldwide Disclosure Facility.

With 10+ years of direct experience at the UK tax authority – HM Revenue and Customs – and over 10 years in the private sector, Amit leverages his specialist tax disputes resolution expertise to analyse the facts and figures concerning HMRC’s “nudge-letters” as well as the non-disclosure related action taken. In India this problem is often referred to as offshore ‘black money’ and it has had its own disclosure facilities in the past.

What is the Worldwide Disclosure Facility (HMRC WDF)?

The Worldwide Disclosure Facility (HMRC WDF), which can be used to disclose a UK tax liability relating to an offshore issue, has now been running since September 2016.

It’s still running, providing individuals who have earned income or achieved gains overseas with a streamlined opportunity to bring their tax affairs up to date, by means of making a voluntary disclosure through an online portal. Provided a full and complete disclosure is made, there is no need to meet HMRC face-to-face or engage in numerous rounds of correspondence about the facts.

“Making such disclosures to HMRC can be uncomfortable, as one must recount what has been done (or not) and explain why. Experienced tax investigation and disclosure specialists will understand this part well and seek to provide peace of mind to their clients, while keeping abreast of WDF developments and HMRC’s practices” added Amit.

What do the HMRC WDF disclosure statistics show?

Let’s start by reviewing the number of WDF disclosures received by HMRC and the number of nudge letters, or one-to-many letters, as HMRC likes to call them nowadays, that were sent. The article has detailed figures, but some 53,000 WDF disclosures have been made (up to and including 2024/25).

From the WDF’s humble beginning in September 2016 where 88 disclosures were received (presumably in the calendar year), then ramping up in 2017, and then the most ever were received in 2018 and 2019 per year. This coincided with the Requirement to Correct (RTC) window. This was so that disclosures could still be based on the regular offshore penalties regime. After that window closed, all disclosures had to be based on the newer, much more aggressive Failure to Correct (FTC) offshore penalties regime — for tax years up to and including 2015/16.

… the average penalties per disclosure has remained quite flat. Averaging a little over £1,000 at their lowest, and up to about £2,500 for other years. We expected them to rise over time as more FTC penalties are involved.

WDF disclosure numbers remaining flat

It is safe to say the number of WDF disclosures received annually has remained quite flat too, which again is quite surprising. But, notably, the number of nudge letters sent out by HMRC has decreased in relative terms over the years, despite more offshore financial accounts data being available to HMRC and their supposedly advanced IT and innovative analysis tools.

So it doesn’t come as a surprise to see that the average taxes secured per disclosure have not increased over time. This is despite the newer extended 12-year tax assessing rule for offshore matters being introduced. One should expect there to be more tax years included in WDF disclosures over time, all other things being equal.

There seems to be no good reason for the average taxes recovered figures being much lower for 2021/22, and for it being much higher for 2022/23. These seem to be anomalies.

Fewer WDF disclosure nudge letters

Interestingly though, it could be that the significant reductions in the number of nudge letters sent in 2021 and 2022 have contributed to the lower yields from disclosures in 2021 onwards. We compared this to the higher tax revenues in earlier years when a lot more nudge letters were sent out.

It is clear that annual revenues from WDF disclosures have never recovered, and neither have the number of nudge letters sent out.

The article had detailed annual figures, but let’s note that in total some £815,654,804 had been raised in taxes, interest and penalties.

Some £665m was secured in taxes, through the WDF. When we include associated late payment interest and penalties thereon, the total revenues are c.£816m. This excludes the future benefit of voluntary compliance, where clients maintain their correct footing and file accurate tax returns as appropriate in the future.

Could HMRC do more to encourage more WDF disclosures?

Of course. There seem to be material issues with their handling of the offshore financial data and/or the quality of that data. It is plain to see the number of WDF disclosures made has remained painfully minuscule compared to the enormous volume of banking data received and available…

As an example, look at the number of disclosures received for 2018 and 2019 — a total of 16,589 — but consider the number of offshore accounts reported to HMRC in say 2017 or 2018 — around 3–4m. The data exponentially eclipsed the number of disclosures.

Also, in May 2022, HMRC reported that in 2019, UK residents had some £850bn in offshore financial accounts. Also, in their No Safe Havens 2019 report, they reported to have received some 5.67m records in 2018 alone pertaining to offshore bank accounts.

There seems to be a lack of ambition at HMRC, despite being armed with so much offshore banking data they could probably swim in it. So it should come as no surprise that we still strongly believe the number of WDF disclosures made has always directly been influenced by the number of nudge letters sent by HMRC.

*** CONTACT: Pure Tax Investigations, 63 St Mary Axe, London, EC3A 8AA, United Kingdom +44 203 7575 669 / pure-tax.com

How can we help with WDF disclosures?

If you or your client has been contacted by HMRC about non-UK / offshore income / Indian interest income and offshore bank accounts then we can help steer that worldwide disclosure facility process, to keep it on track and focused, to bring about a swift and commercial conclusion. We will fully review the underlying records to identify investment interest income, dividends, and gains on assets, so that we robustly prepare annual tax calculations. We are not in the business of procrastinating.

Importantly, we deliver that all-important trusted ‘buffer’ between our clients and HMRC during their in-depth and intrusive investigations and in all voluntary disclosures too.

From experience and speaking to other practitioners, we noted that HMRC has been writing to people with much smaller levels of income overseas and/or those who have not been in the UK for long. That too signals the end of any low-hanging fruit era. But the take-home message remains that, those who wait for HMRC to contact them lose the ability to make a wholly voluntary disclosure and are therefore unable to secure the minimum FTC penalties (100%). Unfortunately, prompted FTC penalties start at 150%.

It is still a good time to review a client’s overseas activities, accounts and wealth to ensure UK taxes on investment income and gains are correctly calculated, disclosed and paid. We encourage seeking out specialist tax disclosures advice where there is a lack of experience in making them and handling corresponding inquiries, to secure the very best possible outcomes for our clients, based on robust knowledge about tax assessment rules regarding time limits, the various offshore penalty regimes that apply, and double taxation relief quirks.

Founded by ex-senior Tax Inspector Amit Puri, who boasts over ten years of direct experience at HM Revenue and Customs, Pure Tax Investigations is a tax investigation specialists boutique firm, offering expert Tax Investigations and Disputes, Business Enquiries and Disclosures support. Along with wider HMRC specialist support to their clients and their existing advisers, as well as some tax restructuring, estate planning and other tax advisory services.

Pure Tax Investigations has become renowned for its pragmatic, client-centric approach, offering clear and bespoke tax advice tailored to each client’s unique tax concerns and business aspirations. Utilising a wide range of local and international accounting and tax knowledge, the HMRC tax investigation specialists provide peace of mind and certainty to clients by ensuring HMRC is effectively managed.

Amit Puri, Pure Tax Investigations: +44 20 3757 5669 / info@pure-tax.com